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ABSTRACT 
Family Leave Policy and Child Health: 
Evidence from 19 OECD Countries from 1969-2010 
 




This study examines the effects of family leave policy on eight child health outcomes - five age 
specific child mortality rates (infant, perinatal, neonatal, post-neonatal, and child mortality rates), 
low birth weight, and immunization rates for measles and DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) 
across 19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 
1969 to 2010. In addition, this dissertation investigates the extent to which the effects of leave 
policy vary by period and across welfare regimes. This research contributes to the existing 
literature (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005) by including one additional country, South Korea, a 
highly developed but considerably understudied country, and by incorporating data from 2001 to 
2010. 
 
I use data on family leave policy from Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) and extend it using data 
from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (MPIDR), Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Health Organization (WHO), International 
Labour Organization (ILO), and World Bank. Additional data sources include the United States 
Social Security Administration (SSA), International Social Security Association (ISSA), and 
various government sources. 
 
I estimate the effects of family leave policy (specially, number of weeks provided) – considering 
both job protected paid leave and other leave (unpaid or non-job protected leave) – on child 
health using ordinary least squares (OLS) models. I control for other relevant variables including 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, health expenditures, healthcare coverage, dialysis 
patients, and fertility and female employment rates. I also include: (1) country fixed effects; (2) 
year fixed effects; and (3) country-time trend interactions. Missing values are imputed 20 times 
using the predictive mean matching method. 
 
The results suggest job protected paid leave significantly reduces infant mortality (deaths less 
than 1 year of age) and post-neonatal mortality (deaths between 1 month and 1 year of age). In 
particular, the largest effects of job protected paid leave are found in reducing post-neonatal 
mortality; the effects are robust throughout all model specifications. Comparing the effects of 
other leave (unpaid or non-job protected) and job protected paid leave, other leave has no 
significant effects on any of the outcome indicators. This suggests that parents do not respond to 
leave provided without adequate payment benefits or job protection, and mothers may return to 
work early. As a result, other leave does not have any significant effects on infant health. 
 
When investigating the effects of family leave policy by period with models estimated separately 
by two time periods, somewhat larger effects of job protected paid leave on post-neonatal 
mortality are found in the earlier period (1969-1989) compared to the later period (1990-2010); 
however, the difference in the policy effects between the two periods is not statistically 
significant. This difference may be explained by the fact that it was during the earlier period 
when most OECD countries provided leave for the first critical weeks and months after birth.  
 
In addition, when examining the effects of leave policy by welfare regime type with models 
estimated separately by regime type, larger effects of job protected paid leave on post-neonatal 
mortality are found in the Social Democratic and Conservative regimes than in the other regime 
types; however, the difference in the policy effects across regime types is not statistically 
significant. This difference may be explained partly by the fact that overall Social Democratic 
and Conservative welfare state countries provide more generous payment benefits for parents on 
leave.  
 
The concluding section discusses how these findings compare to previous research and explores 
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Chapter One: Background 
Introduction 
Dramatic changes have taken place in the family and workforce during the past several 
decades in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
For instance, infant and maternal mortality rates have dropped; life expectancy has soared; 
fertility rates have declined; fewer women have gotten married; many have postponed marriage; 
more couples have decided to cohabitate without getting legally married; and among married 
couples, the divorce rate has increased. In addition, female employment has consistently grown, 
with higher numbers of educated women and more mothers participating in the labor market 
either by choice or out of necessity (OECD, 2011). In the midst of these rapid changes in society, 
many governments in developed countries have recognized families in more diverse forms and 
have made great efforts to address their unique needs and demands by introducing various types 
of family policy. Although the general purpose of family policy is to support and to assist parents 
with having more choices and greater flexibility in balancing their family and work 
responsibilities, the ways in which policy objectives become developed and implemented across 
countries may vary, depending on the country’s specific needs; more explicitly, family policy 
may be designed to: (1) help parents to reconcile work and family decisions and responsibilities; 
(2) promote conditions that can help adults to have the number of children they desire at their 
chosen times; (3) mobilize the female labor supply and promote gender equality in order to foster 
economic growth and financial sustainability; (4) combat child and family poverty; and finally, 
(5) enhance child well-being and promote child development (Adema, 2012; Kamerman & Moss, 
2009).  
As the welfare of children is one of family policy’s most important objectives, most 
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OECD countries have implemented and extended the provision of family policy to help parents, 
especially those who work, to be able to properly take care of their newborns by providing 
financial or in-kind resources as well as more time for family. While various factors may 
influence the well-being of children both at the micro (e.g., breast feeding) and macro (e.g., 
medical infrastructure) levels, this study examines whether family policy— specifically, family 
leave policy—had any effects on child health across 19 OECD countries during the past four 
decades, from 1969 to 2010. The 19 countries
1
 are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea or 
“Korea”), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States (US). Family leave policy includes: (1) maternity leave; (2) parental 
leave; and (3) childcare leave. In this paper, unless noted, leave policy refers only to those three 
types of leave—not including paternity leave (usually a much shorter job-protected leave of 
absence for employed fathers exclusively) or other types of leave, such as sick, holiday, or 
vacation leave. I note that for quantitative analyses, leave policy is measured by the number of 
weeks of job-protected paid leave and the number of weeks of other leave (unpaid or non-job 
protected), as done in previous studies (Ruhm 2000; Tanaka, 2005). Details are provided in the 
sections below. 
The paper uses the theoretical framework that Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) proposed, 
which looked into the effects of leave mandates on child health for a smaller number of countries 
and years; Ruhm (2000) studied 16 European countries from 1969 to 1994, and Tanaka (2005) 
studied 18 countries by adding the US and Japan from 1969 and 2000. I extend their dataset by 
                                                          
1
 I sincerely thank Dr. Christopher Ruhm and Dr. Sakiko Tanaka for kindly sharing the dataset they have developed. 
Their sources include the OECD, International Labor Organization, World Health Organization, United States 
Social Security Administration, and Work Life Research Centre. 
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adding the years 2001 to 2010 and one additional East Asian country, South Korea (“Korea”). 
My study, therefore, contributes to the existing literature as follows: 
(1) No cross-national study on family leave policy and child health exists after 2000, although a 
number of reforms and changes have been made to family policy in 19 OECD countries in 
recent years. In addition to looking at the overall policy effects from 1969 to 2010 for those 
19 countries, I examine whether the policy effects vary by period and across different welfare 
models. 
 
(2) No comparative studies include Korea. Japan is the only East Asian country that has been 
previously considered. By adding Korea, another representative country in East Asia that has 
been traditionally understudied, my research provides a more diverse and balanced view on 
how leave policy impacts child health across various regions. 
 
(3) In addition to maternity and parental leave considered in Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005), I 
also incorporate childcare leave in my research. In the process of developing the dataset that 
Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) created, I use the updated version three of the Comparative 
Family Policy data from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Gauthier, 
2011a) and PF 2.5. Annex: Detail of Change in Parental Leave by Country (OECD, 2012b), 
in addition to data from various international and governmental sources. 
 
In sum, this dissertation addresses two major research questions: 
(1) What is the family leave policy provided in 19 OECD countries? Do different welfare 
regimes have different family leave policies? (Chapter Two) 
 
(2) Does family leave policy have any effects on child health outcomes, and do the policy effects 
vary by period and across welfare regimes? (Chapter Four) 
 
For the first question (Chapter Two), I provide a descriptive historical analysis of family 
policy—mainly, the development of family leave policy—in 19 OECD countries. I also discuss 
provisions for childcare services and financial supports. I discuss family policies in the 19 OECD 
countries according to the five welfare state typologies—Social Democratic, Conservative, 
Southern European, Liberal, and East Asian regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Gauthier, 
2002; Jones, 1993). The ideological perspectives of each welfare model are also discussed in 
order to better understand the overall trend in family policy for countries grouped within the 
same regime. I hypothesize that Social Democratic and Conservative welfare state countries will 
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provide the most generous family leave policies, both in duration and in payment, and that the 
least generous policy will be available in the Liberal and East Asian regimes. I note that great 
variations exist in Continental European countries, specifically between the North and South. 
While countries such as Germany and France (defined as the Conservative regime) have 
undergone numerous family policy reforms and have moved toward the social democratic model, 
especially in recent years, countries including Italy and Spain (defined as the Southern European 
regime) lag behind. 
For the second question (Chapter Four), determining whether family leave policy has any 
effects on child health, I evaluate the effects of leave policy on eight child health outcomes, 
including five age-specific mortality rates—infant, perinatal, neonatal, post-neonatal, and child 
mortality—as well as low birth weight and immunization rates for measles and diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) under 1 year of age. During the past several decades, OECD 
countries have witnessed a dramatic improvement in child health. For instance, Table 1-1 
presents the remarkable achievement of 19 OECD countries in lowering all five mortality rates 
that occur among infants and children (see Appendix 1 for each country’s mean infant mortality 
rates over time by decade and Appendix 2 by year).
2
 According to the OECD Stat Extracts, from 
1970 to the present time, infant mortality (deaths under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births) 
decreased from 22.1 to 3.5; perinatal mortality (deaths within 1 week of life per 1,000 live births 
                                                          
2
I note that the measure of infant mortality can be different across countries and, thus, controversial. For instance, 
in the US, all live births at any birth weight or gestational age, thus including very premature births, are required to 
be reported, whereas in other industrialized countries, they may not be (Berkman & O’Donnell, 2013; MacDorman 
& Mathews, 2009; Liu et al., 1992). However, there is a consensus that it is unlikely that differences in reporting are 
the primary explanation for the US’s relatively low international ranking. (Methodologically speaking, the issue of 
variations across countries is addressed by using country and year fixed effects as well as country-specific time 
trend interaction variables.). It is known that the US is an outlier among wealthy countries for having weak labor 
laws and limited family protection policies (Gornick & Meyers, 2004), which contributes to the continuous decline 
of its ranking in infant mortality from 12
th
 in 1960 to 18
th
 in 1980 and 30
th
 in 2008. For more details on the history 
and trend of infant mortality rates in industrialized countries, see Berkman and O’Donnell (2013). 
5 
 
and stillbirths) dropped from 26.6 to 5.3; neonatal mortality (deaths under 28 days of age per 
1,000 live births) decreased from 14 to 2.3; post-neonatal mortality (deaths between 28 days and 
1 year of age per 1,000 live births) declined from 5.4 to 1.2; and, finally, child mortality (deaths 
between 1 year and 5 years of age per 1,000 live births) dropped from 4.2 to 0.7. While many 
factors have contributed to this remarkable achievement within a relatively short period of time, 
this research aims to look into the effects of family leave policy on child health during the past 
four decades. 
Based on previous studies, mainly Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005), I expect family 
leave policy would have positive effects on child health overall; this hypothesis stems from the 
fact that the policy provides time (and income sources in most OECD countries) for parents, 
especially mothers, before and after childbirth so they can invest more in childcare during the 
first critical weeks and months of a newborn’s life. My study explores this issue more in-depth 
looking into the effects of leave policy on deaths that occur in different phases of an infant’s life 
(up to 5 years of age) and other essential health-related indicators including low birth weight and 
immunization rates. The details on where my hypothesis comes from are further discussed in 
“Theory” section below.  
In addition, I look into how the effects of leave policy vary by period, using models 
estimated separately by two time periods. I hypothesize that during the past four decades, the 
effects of leave policy would be greater in the earlier period (from 1969 to 1989) compared with 
the later period (from 1990 to 2010). It is because in the earlier period, most of the 19 OECD 
countries provided leave policy in the crucial first weeks and months of a newborn’s life, 
whereas in the later period, leave policy became extended beyond those critical first weeks and 
months. Therefore, the policy effects in the later period are expected to be smaller compared to 
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those in the earlier period.  Furthermore, I investigate the effects of leave policy by welfare 
regime with models estimated separately by regime type, as defined above. I hypothesize that the 
policy effects would be larger in the Social Democratic and Conservative regimes than in the 
other regime types, partly due to the fact that the former provide the most generous payment 
benefits for parents who are on leave. However, given numerous variations in family and 
workforce across countries and regimes, this topic needs to be further explored. 
 
Child Health Outcomes 
My research focuses on five age-specific mortality rates, low birth weight, and 
immunization rates for measles and DPT. These are the only available health data that I can 
obtain for 19 OECD countries during the past four decades. I fully acknowledge that other 
important health-related outcomes should be considered, such as breastfeeding or accidents; 
however, sufficient data are not available. Ruhm (2000) pointed out that mortality rates are the 
primary proxy for health because “from a policy perspective, the greatest concern is for problems 
that have lasting effects and, in the extreme, result in death…[and] many health ailments 
afflicting the very young are transitory and have little impact on long-term development” (p. 6). 
Moreover, infant mortality is widely accepted as a proxy for the well-being and health of 
children in the international community (Berkman & O’Donnell, 2013). Infant mortality is also 
closely correlated to socioeconomic status, access to health care, and the health of women of 
fertile age groups as well as other measures of overall population health, including life 
expectancy (MacDorman et al., 1994). 
Previous research has shown that leave schemes may have effects on different age-
specific mortality rates; therefore, it is appropriate to include all five mortality measures that 
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cover ages from 0 to 5: perinatal (death within 1 week of life and stillbirths), neonatal (death 
within 1 month of life), infant (death within 1 year of age), post-neonatal (death between 1 
month and 1 year of age), and child mortality (death between 1 year and 5 years of age). Among 
these outcome indicators, larger effects of policy are expected to be found in reducing deaths that 
occur within the first year after birth: infant (death under 1 year old) and post-neonatal (death 
between 28 days and 1 year old) mortality rates. This hypothesis stems from the fact that the 
activities of parents and their involvement in infant care during the first year of a newborn’s life 
greatly influence the leading causes of infant and post-neonatal deaths (e.g., Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome, accidents, pneumonia and influenza, and homicide), which family leave policy is 
expected to affect (Ruhm, 2000).  
While leave policy, especially pre-birth leave, may have some effects on mortality rates 
that occur within the first month after birth—i.e., perinatal (death within 1 week of life and 
stillbirths) and neonatal (death within 1 month of life) mortality rates—I expect them to be very 
small or possibly nonexistent, as the pre- and at-birth health conditions of the parents are more 
likely to influence those mortality rates (Ruhm, 2000). The parents’ pre- and at-birth health 
statuses would not change dramatically as a result of leave policy, as the 19 OECD countries 
typically provide time off from work for only a short period of time immediately before birth—
approximately five to six weeks, in general (Gauthier, 2011a; Tanaka, 2005). I also include child 
mortality rate (death between 1 year and 5 years of age), as several countries have family leave 
policies that extend beyond one year (e.g., Norway and Sweden); however, I do not expect to 
find significant effects during that period, as I would during the first year of life, because older 
children are more likely to be out of the home and, thus, their mortality would be influenced by 
many other factors.  
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In addition to the five mortality rates, I estimate the effects of family leave policy on 
several secondary health-related outcomes: low birth weight (less than 2,500 grams) and 
immunizations for measles and DPT within one year of a newborn’s life. I include low birth 
weight because, similar to perinatal and neonatal mortality rates, it may be affected by leave 
policy, specifically pre-birth leave, which may contribute to the mother’s pre-birth health. Leave 
policy may also influence immunization rates, as parents who are on leave would have more time 
to take their infants to get the necessary immunizations during the first critical year after birth. 
However, I note that the effects of leave policy on these secondary outcome indictors may be 
very small or possibly nonexistent. For low birth weight, the hypothesis is based on the fact that 
the parents’ pre-birth conditions may not change dramatically because of the short length of 
recommended pre-birth leave, as mentioned previously. Regarding immunizations for measles 
and DPT, the hypothesis for small or no effects comes from the fact that the immunization rates 
in the 19 OECD countries have been already very high (i.e., in the high 90s, without much 
fluctuation); thus, it may be difficult to see variations due to the policy effects (Tanaka, 2005). 
 
Theory: Family Leave Policy and Child Health 
In order to better understand theoretically how child health outcomes are related to leave 
policy, I follow the economic model that Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) used, wherein parents 
try to maximize the utility function (child health, in this case) within their given financial and 
time constraints (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982). Financial constraints are shaped by all income 
sources, including payments during leave as well as total expenditures and consumptions. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that an increase in income may improve child health outcomes 
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both pre- and post-birth by, for instance, providing more health capital, such as health-related 
goods and nutritious foods (Leibowitz, 2003). 
Furthermore, time constraints (which are more relevant in this particular study because I 
investigate the effects of family leave policy in weeks) are subject to factors such as the total 
time at work and the total time on leave. According to this theory, leave policy would influence 
child health outcomes by increasing the parents’ time away from work, which could be spent 
with their infants instead (Tanaka, 2005). The increase in time with their newborns can help 
parents to further engage in care-related activities, which may benefit child health. Among others, 
breastfeeding is one of the most-studied activities related to the length of leave. While 
breastfeeding greatly benefits child health (Chen & Rogan, 2004; Lawrence, 1997), copious 
amounts of literature indicate that employment makes it difficult for mothers to breastfeed their 
infants; more specifically, positive effects of an increase in maternity leave on breastfeeding are 
reported (Arthur et al., 2003; Baker & Milligan, 2008; Berger et al., 2005; Blau et al., 1996; 
Jacknowitz, 2008; Johnston & Esposito, 2007; Roe et al., 1999; Staehelin et al., 2007; Visness & 
Kennedy, 1997; Yilmaz et al., 2002). However, although breastfeeding is an important 
contributor to child health, sufficient data for the 19 OECD countries during the past four 
decades are not available; thus, breastfeeding will not be included in this research. In sum, leave 




Theoretically speaking, other important factors might influence child health; therefore, I 
consider them as control variables when the data are available. While family leave policy that is 
                                                          
3
However, there may be some negative effects where mothers work to be qualified for their leave entitlement prior to 




designed to mitigate financial and time constraints is the central focus, child health outcomes are 
indeed influenced by many different factors, both at the micro and macro levels. First, as noted 
above, the baseline health and lifestyle of the parents before birth would greatly matter in child 
health outcomes, especially regarding deaths within the first month of a newborn’s life, such as 
perinatal and neonatal mortality rates, as well as low birth weight. For instance, expecting 
mothers’ smoking and drinking can result in higher rates of early mortality rates and low birth 
weight (Chomitz et al., 1995; Difranza et al., 2004; Frisbie et al., 1996; Lightwood et al., 1999). 
In addition, Mozurkewich et al. (2000) reported that physically demanding working conditions 
for expecting mothers (e.g., long working hours and prolonged standing) can result in high rates 
of adverse birth outcomes, such as low birth weight. Prenatal care (e.g., receiving advice on 
vitamin use and proper weight gain) is another factor that can impact early mortality rates and 
birth weight (Kogan et al., 1994). However, data on these indicators for the 19 OECD countries 
during the past four decades are not available. 
On the macro level, medical care infrastructure and availability is an important factor for 
expecting mothers to have healthy infants. For instance, neonatal intensive care can be critical in 
the early days of a newborn’s life (Currie & Gruber, 1997); this is taken into consideration via a 
proxy indicator: the number of patients under dialysis, as done in previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; 
Tanaka, 2005). The total health expenditures can be another macro-level factor, although no 
comparative research exists with this specific indicator concerning its effects on health outcomes 
for children (Waldfogel, 2004). GDP per capita, a universally used indicator that determines a 
country’s economic status, is known to have effects in decreasing infant mortality (Ferrarini & 
Sjoberg, 2010; Pritchett & Summers, 1996), though other studies argue that such effects can be 
uncertain (Ruhm, 2003; Tapia Granados, 2005). While the direct causal effects of these factors 
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on child health can be argued, they are likely to be related to my outcome variables and, thus, 




Terminology: Family Leave Policy 
Family policy is generally measured with three indicators: (1) family leave policy; (2) 
financial supports; and (3) public childcare services (Gauthier, 1999; Kamerman, 2009). In this 
dissertation, while the latter two are briefly discussed, my main focus is on family leave policy: 
(1) weeks of maternity leave; (2) weeks of parental leave; and (3) weeks of childcare leave. 
Leave benefits have existed since the 1880s in Europe: first in Germany in 1883 with health 
insurance, paid sick leave, and paid maternity leave (Kamerman, 2000b). Family leave policy 
has developed very differently across countries, as I discuss in the following chapter, and 
underlying policy objectives and dimensions of family leave policy can be emphasized in 
different ways, including: (1) economic,
4
 as leave policy affects labor force behaviors and 
market regulation; (2) social,
5
 as leave policy may affect the welfare of working mothers as well 
as the emotional, cognitive, and physical health and development of children; and (3) 
                                                          
4
 Rich literature exists on the impact of parental leave on women’s labor market outcomes. See Thevenon & Solaz 
(2013) for the latest analysis; this cross-national study on the 30 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010 reports that 
the extension of paid leave has positive, though small, effects on female employment and the gender ratio of 
employment within two years of leave. On the other hand, leave that is longer than two years has negative effects on 
female employment and on the gender employment gap. 
5
 Rich literature also exists on maternal employment and child development both on cross-national and specific 
country levels; for instance, Huerta et al. (2011) examines five OECD countries and suggests that a return to paid 
work by mothers within six months after childbirth may have negative effects on child outcomes, particularly on 
cognitive development, although the effects are small and not universally observed. Other studies have looked into 
individual countrie sin order to understand the relationship between parental employment and child developmental 





 because leave policy can influence parents’ reproductive decisions, i.e., whether 
to have children, how many, and when to have them (Thevenon & Solaz, 2013).  
Here I provide a brief introduction to the three main types of family leave. Maternity 
leave includes a leave arrangement that grants employed mothers a designated job-protected 
period of absence before and after childbirth, and it is usually paid (Kamerman, 2000a). In 1919, 
the first Convention on Maternity Protection of the International Labour Organization (ILO)
7
 
recommended 12 weeks with a compulsory six-week post-birth period. In 2000, the convention 
was revised to stipulate 14 weeks of recommended leave with six weeks of compulsory leave 
after childbirth at the minimum payment of 2/3 of earnings during that time (Kamerman, 2000b; 
Tanaka, 20005). Almost all OECD countries—except for the US (no federal mandate) and Korea 
(13 weeks)—have ratified the minimum duration of 14 weeks of paid leave that the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) recommends and have provided specific public income supports tied 
to the duration of maternity leave (OECD, 2012a). Countries do vary in the time periods in 
which they adopted the ILO recommendations for maternity leave. For instance, Portugal, Spain, 
and Finland between the late 1960s and early 1970s established employment reinstatement 
provisions that meet the ILO standards, and similar legislations were passed in France and in the 
Netherlands in the mid-1970s, followed by Denmark, Ireland, and Greece in the early 1980s 
                                                          
6
 Many studies examined the effects of family policy on fertility rates—both at cross-national and specific country 
levels. Though it varies, the literature overall reports the positive effects of leave policy in increasing fertility rates. 
See Luci and Thevenon (2012) for the most recent analysis; using data from the 18 OECD countries from 1982 to 
2007, this study reports that a family policy package (paid leave, childcare services, and financial transfers) has 
positive effects on fertility rates. 
7
Ratified by 33 countries, the convention specified that a woman who works in either the public and private sectors: 
(a) shall not be permitted to work during the six weeks following her confinement; (b) shall have the right to leave 
her work if she produces a medical certificate stating that her confinement will probably take place within six weeks; 
(c) shall, while she is absent from her work, in pursuance of paragraphs (a) and (b), be paid benefits sufficient for 
the full and healthy maintenance of herself and her child, provided either out of public funds or by means of a 
system of insurance; and (d) shall in any case, if she is nursing her child, be allowed half an hour twice a day 
during her working hours for this purpose (ILO, 1919, Article 3; Moss & Kamerman, 2009). 
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(Ruhm, 1998). In Asia, Japan was the first country to enact the maternity leave legislation as part 
of the Labor Standard Law in 1947 (Tanaka, 20005). Almost all OECD and European Union 
(EU) countries now have standards that exceed the ILO recommendation of 14 weeks of leave 
(ILO, 2010). However, while most OECD countries currently have family leave policies in place, 
many differences and disparities exist in the detailed components of the policies, such as 
duration, payment availability and rate, take-up flexibility, and whether the leave is given as a 
family or individual right, i.e., whether the entitlement can be transferrable between the two 
parents or not (Moss & Kamerman, 2009). 
Parental leave is a gender-neutral leave from employment that is usually taken after 
maternity leave (Kamerman, 2000a). Parental leave is designed to offer parents additional 
opportunities for more time to take care of their newborns; as of 2010, all countries, except for 
countries such as Switzerland and the US, provide at least some type of payment benefit during 
parental leave, either earning-related or based on a flat rate. The way in which parental leave is 
provided varies because it can be granted as: (1) family rights that parents can divide between 
themselves as they choose; (2) individual rights, which are transferrable to the other parent; and 
(3) non-transferable individual rights, whereby both parents are given an entitlement to a 
specified amount of leave, i.e. mommy or daddy quotas on a “use it or lose it” basis (Thevenon 
& Solaz, 2013). Some countries, such as Sweden and Norway, do not have legal frameworks of 
distinction between maternity and parental leave, although they usually set aside certain periods 
lasting several weeks for each parent’s specific use (Gauthier, 2011b). 
Childcare leave (sometimes called homecare leave) is a leave entitlement to care for 
children until they are up to three years old as a variation or extension of parental leave, and 
payments are not necessarily restricted to parents with prior work requirements (OECD, 2012a). 
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Countries, including Belgium and all of the Nordic/Scandinavian countries (e.g., Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden) provide paid childcare leave ranging from 13 weeks to 128 weeks 
(Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). Payments vary across countries; for instance, Finland makes 
homecare-related income supports contingent on not using public day care facilities, and 
payment rates in Norway vary with the number of hours that publicly provided day care is used 
(Thevenon & Solaz, 2013). Though not discussed in depth in this study, other types of leave, 
such as paternity leave (usually a much shorter job-protected leave of absence for employed 
fathers exclusively), as well as other additional leave entitlements (e.g., holidays or sick leave), 
are available to attend to family and child matters. I note that the 12 weeks of job-protected leave 
entitlement in the US under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are counted as unpaid 
childcare leave for this research (Gauthier, 2011a). 
 
Previous Studies 
Overall, all previous cross-national studies have found that longer leave is positively 
related to better child welfare. Winegarden and Bracy (1995) examined 17 OECD European 
countries from 1959 to 1989 and reported that an extra week of paid maternity leave is 
significantly associated with a reduction in infant mortality by 0.5 per 1,000 live births. Ruhm 
(2000) looked at the effects of paid maternity leave on various pediatric mortality rates for 16 
European countries from 1969 to 1994; the author indicated that extended paid maternity leave 
has the largest effects in reducing post-neonatal (between 28 days and one year of life) mortality. 
Tanaka (2005), as an extension of Ruhm’s (2000) research using data on 18 OECD countries 
from 1969 to 2000, also concluded that job-protected paid leave has positive effects on child 
health outcomes, especially in reducing the post-neonatal mortality rate, consistent with Ruhm’s 
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(2000) finding. In addition, some studies have looked into the effects of paternity leave and 
found positive policy effects on child health (O’Brien, 2009; Tanaka & Waldfogel, 2007). 
Some studies looked at the effects of leave policy on child poverty, and all of them found 
positive effects in reducing the poverty rate (Engster & Stensota, 2011; Ferrarini, 2006; Misra et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, studies that investigated the effects of family policy on child welfare in 
individual countries indicated consistent findings overall. For instance, Roe et al. (1999) found a 
positive correlation between maternity leave after childbirth and the duration of breastfeeding in 
the US, using the US Food and Drug Administration’s Infant Feeding Practices Study from 1993 
to 1994. Using micro-data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Berger 
et al. (2005) also found that returning to work within 12 weeks of childbirth has negative effects 





Chapter Two: Comparison of Family Leave Policy in 19 OECD Countries 
Ideological Perspectives of Social Policy across Welfare State Models 
Before I discuss the current status of family leave policy in 19 OECD countries, I will 
first discuss the ideological perspectives of social policy across the five different welfare state 
models. These ideological perspectives can help to explain how and why each type of welfare 
state has different packages of social policy, of which family leave is one part. In order to 
explain the ideological perspectives of family policy, I mainly use Esping-Andersen’s (1990; 
1999) three welfare state models: (1) Social Democratic; (2) Conservative; and (3) Liberal 
welfare regimes. The Social Democratic welfare regime (which is found in the 
Nordic/Scandinavian countries, such as Finland and Sweden) is often characterized by its 
universal rights, such as social insurance and public services, based on individual citizenship. In 
countries under this regime, the focus of social policy is on the role of the state. Through such 
universal rights, governments aim to promote equality among all citizens, which is often related 
to the narrowing of gender and income gaps. Indeed, public provisions of childcare and financial 
support, as well as family leave policy, are the most universal and extensive in this regime. 
On the other hand, the Conservative (or Continental European) welfare regime
8
 (which is 
found in Germany
9
 and Italy) is characterized by its occupation-related social security systems, 
which usually focus on the role of family, especially the head of the family who works (usually 
the father). Due to the nature of a system that provides social insurance and benefits according to 
the occupation of the head of the family, countries under this welfare regime have often been 
characterized by the most gender-specific division of labor. The system is often based on the 
                                                          
8
 The regime includes most of the Northern Continental European countries, such as Germany, France, and Austria, 
as well as the Southern countries, including Italy, Spain, and Portugal, although there has been a significant 
divergence between the two regions; therefore, I discuss them separately in the sections below. 
9
 West Germany specifically—however, I will discuss West and East Germany as well as the unified German system.  
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assumption that each family member is designated a specific role—e.g., the mother stays at 
home and cares for family members. Therefore, family leave policy as well as public childcare 
services and financial supports are less developed. Such matters are expected to be addressed 
within the family. However, in recent years, great efforts have been made to reform family 
policy in some of the Conservative (or Continental European) countries, and we now see more of 
a split between the North (e.g. Germany and France) and South (e.g. Italy and Spain). This will 
be further discussed below. 
Finally, the Liberal welfare regime
10
 (e.g., the US and the UK) is overall characterized by 
its means-tested and relatively limited welfare benefits, which focus on the role of the free 
market and are not bound by government intervention. As far as family policy is concerned, a 
basic understanding of such a welfare regime also applies. Due to the highly competitive nature 
of the free market and the emphasis on participants’ economic performances and capacities, both 
employers and employees (especially employers) are very unlikely to provide or to take leave, 
respectively. The overall provisions of public childcare and financial support are minimal due to 
the nature of the market-driven system that emphasizes the individual’s responsibility for such 
“personal” matters, according to one’s capability of affording childcare. 
Chesnais (1996) offered another unique (albeit related) analysis on the ideological views 
on family policy. Focusing on the differing statuses of women in European countries, he made an 
interesting distinction between “nations of families” and “nations of individuals.” For instance, 
Germany, which is one of the nations of families, has historically regarded the family as the 
central pillar of its society; thus, its social policy is designed to be supportive of the family. 
                                                          
10
 Although I chose the US as one of the representative countries of the Liberal model along with the UK, I note that, 
in terms of family policy, other Liberal welfare state countries have undergone considerable reforms since a decade 
ago. Recently, countries such as Australia and the UK have been actively undergoing the process of implementing 
more friendly-family policy, especially for childcare and education. Details are further discussed in sections below. 
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Those family-oriented countries can be characterized by the Conservative welfare regime. In 
countries under this regime, nurseries are scarce, kindergartens are expensive, and school hours 
do not complement the needs of working mothers; moreover, the patriarchal ideal of women 
staying at home and taking care of their husbands and children still exists. 
On the other hand, Liberal countries, which can be considered “nations of individuals,” 
are known for their longstanding individualism, specifically with an emphasis on one’s 
performances and on capacities in the competitive free market system. However, due to the 
market-driven economy and means-tested welfare benefits, accompanied with the lack of 
government involvement, no coherent family policy has emerged in these countries. In addition, 
in nations of individuals—Liberal countries, such as the US and the UK—the vulnerable 
members of society can be greatly affected because they often cannot afford on their own to 
substitute for what the family policy is not providing. The individual responsibilities cannot be 
fulfilled in many cases. 
Countries under the Social Democratic regime are also characterized as “nations of 
individuals” because their individualism is a prevalent social and cultural norm. However, this 
regime’s approach to family policy is very different compared with that of the Liberal regime. 
The individualism in these countries emphasizes how the government deals with and supports 
individual citizens by providing universal rights. Rather than entrusting people into the hands of 
the free market system, the government intervenes in both individual and familial matters as it 
aims for the equality of all. In addition, the entire national financial system, including tax 
benefits, is dealt with independently and individually. Indeed, the state’s heavy intervention in 
providing universal rights and benefits based on individual citizenship has led to creating the 
most generous and extensive family policies. According to Chesnais (1996), such countries are 
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also known for their welfare state doctrine that combines, among other things, feminism 
(emphasis on women’s autonomy and professional activity), neo-Malthusianism (emphasis on 
sex education and access to free contraception), and, though not explicit, pronatalism. 
Furthermore, Crompton’s (1999) analysis of gendered divisions of labor also provided 
interesting ideological views on family policy in different countries. From the “most traditional” 
to “less traditional” gender arrangements, the author offered five models, namely the following: 
(1) male breadwinner and female career; (2) dual earner and female part-time career; (3) dual 
earner and state career; (4) dual earner and marketized career; and (5) dual earner and dual career. 
While the author did not directly link the five gender arrangement models to Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990; 1999) three welfare state paradigms, it is clear that they are also fairly consistent with the 
traditional three welfare state typology. For instance, the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, which 
are characterized by the Social Democratic welfare regime, have developed versions of the dual 
earner and state career arrangement while ideally promoting the dual earner and dual career 
model by introducing various new sets of family policy. While the detailed discussions of policy 
for each country will be presented below, it is clear that countries under the Social Democratic 
welfare regime are, indeed, characterized by the most developed women-friendly policy; such a 
policy is designed to narrow the wage gap between men and women as well as to provide 
generous family leave policy for both mothers and fathers in striving toward greater gender 
equality. 
On the other hand, countries under the Conservative welfare regime tend to be aligned 
with a more traditional male-breadwinner and female career model. Countries such as Germany 
and Italy, which represent the Conservative welfare regime, are examples of countries that adopt 
this model. With the most traditional family structure and gender roles—i.e., fathers in the labor 
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market and mothers at home—countries in this regime are characterized by providing little to 
facilitate women in fully participating in the labor market and in balancing their family and work 
responsibilities. However, the current trend of reforms and changes in family policy indicates 
that many OECD countries are moving away from this model for various reasons. For instance, 
in Germany, a series of rather dramatic reforms have taken place in family policy in recent years; 
some even question whether its entire welfare system aims to move toward an-almost Nordic 
system (Erler, 2009). 
In countries under the Liberal welfare regime—especially the US, where the state plays 
little role in providing family-friendly policy—the increase in female employment has been 
followed by the development of the dual-earner and “marketized” substitute care model. 
However, due to the highly competitive nature of the free market, the emphasis on participants’ 
economic performances and capacities, and the lack of government intervention and support, this 
type of system can be detrimental, especially for the most vulnerable, who simply cannot afford 
the substitute arrangements while having to work. Therefore, the private substitute care model 
can actually increase the level of inequality in society because one can only get what he or she 
can pay for. 
Gornick and Meyers (2004) identified three variations in ideological perspectives of 
family policy. Referring to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999)’s three welfare state models, they 
examined how each welfare regime emphasizes (or fails to emphasize) the following: (1) child 
well-being; (2) balancing work and family; and (3) gender relations. The authors concluded that 
family policy that supports all three ideological aspects is most developed in the Social 
Democratic regime. Indeed, with the most generous and gender-egalitarian policy designs, on 
average, parents do spend more time with their children, and they equally divide both paid and 
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unpaid work between themselves; in fact, overall, children do much better on major well-being 
outcomes in Social Democratic welfare state countries. 
In contrast, Conservative countries seem to lag, especially in balancing work and family 
responsibilities as well as in gender relations. Italy is a good example of this. Countries under 
this regime are characterized by their lack of state provision of family services, deeply-rooted 
gender inequality, and unstable economic conditions; therefore, more women end up staying at 
home to take care of family members rather than looking for employment opportunities (Bettio 
& Villa, 1998). The welfare system, which first places emphasis on protecting the family, lags in 
promoting equality between genders and in facilitating working women to reconcile work and 
family responsibilities. However, given that mothers are encouraged to stay at home, countries 
under this category performed well in the child welfare category. 
Liberal countries lag even more so. This is especially true in the US, where family policy 
is, by far, the most minimal compared with other countries. Indeed, Gornick and Meyers (2004) 
demonstrated that except for a moderate degree of gender equality in the labor market, the 
outcomes on child well-being and balancing work and family responsibilities are extremely poor 
in the US. For instance, employed parents work for pay, jointly, 80 hours per week and cannot 
spend much time with their children. Therefore, Liberal welfare states countries, especially the 
US, are expected to have relatively poorer child outcomes, whether they are physical or cognitive, 
compared with other welfare state countries. Also, when it comes to indicators such as child 
poverty and mortality rates, school performance, and teen pregnancy, Liberal countries perform 
much more poorly. However, countries within the same Liberal regime, such as the UK and 
Australia, have undergone significant family policy reforms, especially in recent years; therefore, 
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it is really the US that falls as an outlier, as it still does not offer paid leave on the federal level 
following childbirth. 
Additionally, some scholars (Engster & Stensota, 2011; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2000; 
Korpi & Palme, 1998) have distinguished three types of regime based on the scope of family 
policy. They argued that Esping-Andersen(1990; 1999)’s traditional three-model categorization 
is less practical for analyzing potential connections between policies and outcomes. For instance, 
the categorization made by Engster and Stensota (2011) to understand family policy is as follows: 
(1) dual-earner support regimes, including Sweden and Norway, that are characterized by low to 
medium levels of cash allowances and tax benefits for families with children but high levels of 
public support for paid family leave policy and childcare services; (2) general family support 
regimes, including France and Germany, which provide the exact opposite of what the dual-
earner support regimes provide—i.e., high levels of cash allowances and tax benefits for families 
with children but low to medium support for paid family leave policy and childcare services; and 
(3) market-oriented or low family support regimes, including the US, the UK, Italy, and Spain—
all of which provide overall low levels of family support—i.e., low levels of cash and tax 
benefits as well as very low support for paid leave policy and childcare services. 
Finally, some studies (Ferrera, 1996; Flaquer, 2000; Gauthier, 2002; Leibfried, 1992; 
Lynch, 2006) extended the traditional three welfare state typologies into the four categories by 
incorporating one additional distinct model—the “Southern European” regime (originally part of 
the Conservative model)—which includes countries in the Mediterranean area, such as Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Not all researchers, however, supported the idea of separately 
identifying the Southern European countries as an additional distinct welfare regime; for instance, 
scholars such as Katrougalos (1996) argued that many particular commonalities exist in the 
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systems of those countries, they are not qualitatively sufficient to create a new institutional 
paradigm or a “South-European” welfare regime. However, more scholars now endorse the four 
model typology due to a significant divergence in family policy and welfare state between the 
North and South among the Continental European countries, especially in recent decades. 
In my dissertation, in addition to those four welfare models—the Social Democratic, 
Conservative, Southern European, and Liberal regimes—I also include the East Asian welfare 
model, focusing on Japan and Korea. Since Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999)’s study on the 
welfare typology, there have been more discussions on how some of the OECD countries do not 
fit into such a regime categorization (Aspalter, 2006; Goodman & Peng, 1996; Jones, 1993; 
Kwon, 1997); in addition to the discussion on the Southern European model, another important 
development of the welfare state scholarship is concerning East Asian countries. Though Japan 
has previously received some attention, the “East Asian” welfare model is a relatively new term 
in this topic; as such, there still exist different opinions about it. 
In the East Asian welfare model, there has been an emphasis on the heavy concentration 
of social and human investment, especially through education and healthcare, mostly for political 
and economic purposes, at least in the 1940s and 1950s (Gough, 2002). Governments faced the 
urgent responsibilities and obligations to appeal to their citizens for the nation’s legitimacy, 
recovery, and stability after the defeat in the Second World War (Japan) and departure from the 
Japanese colonization (Korea). This may be a reason that East Asian countries had to rather 
abruptly and dramatically develop their social welfare system. 
East Asian countries are known to have the “Confucian welfare state,” which strongly 
focuses on patriarchal relationships between men and women—i.e., fixed traditional gender roles 
(Palley, 1992; Sung, 2003). In addition, they all developed an economy centered on grand 
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national corporations and shared their qualities of governance in the “top-down-consensus by 
persuasion and/or imposition” (Jones, 1993). Goodman & Peng (1996), with yet another term to 
refer to this model (the “Japan-focused East Asian regime”), discussed the distinctive 
commonalties shared by Japan and the four Tiger East Asian countries (South Korea, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan) in various sectors of society. Esping-Andersen (1997) used the term 
“hybrid” to imply its mixed features from the Social Democratic, Conservative, and Liberal 
welfare regimes, sharing with the Nordic Social Democratic regime a strong commitment to full 
employment, with the Liberal regime the safety net and heavy reliance on private welfare 
(Mahon, 2002a), and also with the Conservative Continental Europe regime “a strong emphasis 
on the family and corporate or occupational welfare” (Peng, 2002). Furthermore, the term 
“productivist welfare capitalism” in East Asia was explored to understand its overall trend in 
welfare policy (Holliday, 2000); the author stated that the system is strongly growth-oriented. 
Indeed, countries in East Asia are often described as the “developmental states” where capitalism 
is practiced and advanced under the strong—even controlling—state power and intervention via 
economic policies with specific development objectives (Johnson, 1999). They are also called 
the “adaptive developmental states,” as now, scholars are interested in the evolving roles of 
government after these countries achieved a high level of economic development—i.e., East 
Asian Miracle—in the past few decades (Kwon, 2004; Peng, 2004; Wong, 2004). According to 
the literature, it is clear that the East Asian experience is decisively different from that of the 
Western world, particularly in terms of welfare state and family policy; therefore, it is 





Countries in Social Democratic Regime 
Among OECD countries, Social Democratic welfare state countries overall provide the 
most generous family policy, granting mothers 30–42 weeks of leave with full-time wage 
replacement. Family policy in the Social Democratic regime is characterized by the universal 
support for families, high level of support for working parents, and commitment to gender equity 
(Gauthier, 2002). The regime includes the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, including Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, and Finland. 
Sweden 
Sweden first introduced unpaid maternity leave in 1901, providing eight weeks of 
maternity leave with a lump-sum payment benefit in 1931, which eventually increased to 26 
weeks with the payment at 80% of earnings in 1963 (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b). In 1974, 
maternity leave was replaced with parental leave; therefore, there is currently no distinction 
between maternity and parental leave in Sweden, though nine weeks are reserved exclusively for 
mothers (Gauthier, 2011a). Almost all families use paid parental leave in Sweden. The Swedish 
government currently provides 480 days of leave at about 65% of earnings—the first 390 days at 
80% and the remaining 90 days at a flat rate payment of about $28 per day (Chronholm, 2009). 
Moreover, there is an additional childcare leave of 12.5 weeks (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). Family 
and child allowances (approximately $176 per month) are universal for all residents with 
children under the age of sixteen, and more generous compared with what is provided in other 
developed countries (Clearinghouse, 2008). Indeed, as seen in Table 1-3, social expenditures 
spent on families are much higher (3.7% of GDP), compared with the average of 19 OECD 
countries (2.3%), and among the highest. 
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Furthermore, Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) is universal, and the fees are 
determined by the incomes of the parents (maximum fees set at 1-3% of income); the current 
coverage of/access to ECEC is 75% of children between ages one and six (Clearinghouse, 2008). 
The family policy laying the platforms for the dual earner/dual carer model (Crompton, 1999) 
began to emerge in Sweden in the course of the 1960s and 1970s due to the increasing rate of 
maternal employment (Sainsbury 1996, 1999; Bergqvist et al., 1999). This new approach to 
gender equity in the labor market as well as the responsibilities for children and family became 
manifested in the Swedish law and policy discourse. 
However, the generous and supportive system in Sweden and other similar Social 
Democratic countries is not completely free from its own problems and new issues to confront. 
In the 1990s, one of the most critical periods for the Swedish welfare state with the economic 
downturn, decline of the public finances, and increase in unemployment rate from 1.6% in 1990 
to 5.5% in 1999, the non-socialist political parties promoted their goal of adopting neo-liberal 
alternatives that focused on choice, decentralization, free market, and privatization, as well as 
cost reduction and retrenchment of social expenditures (Nyberg et al., 2007). The consequences 
were clearly shown in family policy. For instance, the payment rate for parental leave was 
reduced by about 25% during that time period (Gauthier, 2011b). In addition, while public 
childcare still remained a high priority, it was inevitable that fewer resources had to be spent per 
child; the demand and supply of childcare still did not match, and the number of children per 
childcare worker increased. Moreover, while the majority of the childcare system still remained 
publicly regulated and financed, the decentralization of the system led to more private childcare 
services, and vulnerable populations (such as unemployed parents and immigrants) experienced 
difficulties in benefiting from family policy (Bergqvist & Nyberg, 2002). Therefore, the 
27 
 
inequality in accessing childcare services for parents with different professions and income 
levels still existed in the country.  
In the early 2000s under the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, the oldest and 
largest party in Sweden, a step toward extending the benefits of both parental and childcare leave 
was taken. Municipalities were now obliged to offer children of unemployed parents pre-school 
care for at least 15 hours per week; moreover, starting in 2002, they were also extended to 
include children of parents who were on parental leave with another child, and pre-school 
activities for 4- and 5-year-olds were introduced in 2003, consisting of 15 hours of childcare per 
week free of charge (Nyberg, 2004). Parental leave increased from 30 days to 480 days, of which 
90 days were paid at the basic level ($18) and the lowest level ($9) per day; moreover, the daddy 
quota was extended to 60 days per parent (Moss & Korintus, 2008). In 2008 under the leadership 
of the center-right and liberal-conservative party, the Gender Equality Bonus was introduced to 
offer an economic incentive for families to divide parental leave; the bonus offered the parent 
who stayed at home the longest a bonus when he or she went back to work, while the other 
parent used the parental leave (OECD, 2012b). This also applied to parents who did not live 
together. 
The Swedish parental leave system is known to be very flexible. Today, it is possible to 
choose between a full day’s leave as well as three quarters, one half, one quarter, or even one 
eighth (one hour) of a day’s leave; parents are also entitled to full-time leave from work until the 
child is 18 months old or as long as he or she is paid parental allowances (Nyberg, 2004). 
Moreover, as seen in Table 1-2, Sweden has one of the highest female employment rates—70%, 
compared with the 19 OECD average of 62%. Its fertility rate is also among the highest—1.98 
compared with the 19 OECD average of 1.68. Child health outcomes are known to be better 
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compared with those in other countries (Gornick & Meyers, 2004), and this study will further 
examine how they are influenced by leave policy. In Sweden, the dual earner/dual carer model of 
the Social Democratic regime is expected to remain as is, regardless of which party comes into 
power; however, the country will have to continue to evolve in response to dramatic changes that 
take place with the contexts of an open economy, marketization, privatization, and globalization 
(Bergqvist & Nyberg, 2002). 
Norway 
Norway, not a member state of the EU, currently provides 56 weeks of parental leave at a 
100% payment rate as well as 51 weeks of additional childcare leave at a 10% payment rate until 
the child’s second birthday; though there is no separate system of maternity leave, nine weeks 
are reserved exclusively for mothers, similar to Sweden (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). There was a 
separate maternity leave system when Norway introduced a flat-rate paid leave for mothers in 
1915; it was first for eight weeks and became extended to 12 weeks in 1947 (Brandth & Kvande, 
2009; Gauthier, 2011b). Norway was the first country to reserve part of paid parental leave 
exclusively for fathers (it was lost if not used by the father—“take it or lose it”), which makes 
the country the leading figure in family policy as well as in fathers’ rights (Brandth & Kvande, 
2009). The gender egalitarian family model, wherein fathers and mothers equally share paid 
work and domestic responsibilities, has been a dominating ideal in the social policy discourse 
and has been a driving force for policy reforms in Norway (Knudsen & Waerness, 2001). It is, 
therefore, one of the main policy objectives in work-family policy to promote both female 
employment as well as fathers’ family engagement (Kitterod & Lappengard, 2012). 
Under the 1977 Work Environment Act, maternity leave was replaced by parental leave, 
which gave equal rights to mothers and fathers for family and work responsibilities. The idea of 
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equal rights between mothers and fathers was behind the extension of leave—from 12 weeks to 
18 weeks and fully paid; moreover, of those 18 weeks, 12 weeks could be shared between the 
parents, implying that the right to parental leave was not only for women, but that it was also for 
men (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b; Rosen & Sundstrom, 2001). Moreover, under the reform, 
fathers could take two weeks of unpaid father’s leave (“daddy days”) to be with family at the 
time of the child’s birth and on the way back home from hospital (Brandth & Kvande, 2009). 
Later, father’s leave became extended to five weeks in 2005, six weeks in 2006, and 10 weeks in 
2009 (Lappergard, 2010). 
The full paid parental leave was further extended up from 18 weeks to 24 weeks in the 
1980s; moreover, the provision continued to increase in the 1990s from 24 weeks to 42 weeks 
(Carneiro et al., 2009; Rosen, 2004). More options were available when taking leave; for 
instance, parents could take 30 weeks at an 80% payment rate instead of taking 24 weeks at full 
pay, or they could take 52 weeks at 80% instead of 42 weeks at full pay (OECD, 2012b). In 1998, 
the cash benefit scheme for families with children aged one to two was introduced, which 
became further extended to support parents with children aged 2 years to 3 years in 1999. 
Childcare leave was also extended in 1999, which was covered until the child’s second birthday. 
In 2005, father’s leave increased by one week and parental leave to 43 weeks at full pay (Moss & 
Korintus, 2008; OECD, 2012b). 
In 2011, parental leave became 47 weeks at full pay or 57 weeks at an 80% payment rate 
instead, giving parents more flexibility. In addition to the generous provisions of parental and 
childcare leave, more extensive formal day care facilities are provided in Norway compared with 
other OECD countries; however, the demand for care facilities is still larger than the supply of 
available places (Rosen & Sundstrom, 2002). Day care centers in Norway may be owned and run 
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as either public or private enterprises, but both forms of ownership receive government subsidies, 
with the local government approving of the services provided at the center (Lappergard, 2010). 
The government spends about 3.2% of its GDP for social expenditures on families, which is 
much higher than the average of what the overall OECD countries spend—2.3%, as seen in 
Table 1-3. 
The Social Democratic countries pioneered in offering the most generous and extensive 
family policy packages to both parents compared with countries of other welfare models, and 
they were mainly motivated by gender equality ideologies and child/family welfare, rather than 
pro-natalistic objectives (Rosen, 2004). However, Norway, compared with other Nordic 
countries, has more ambiguous family policy objectives in providing incentives for both gender 
equality as well as childrearing at home (Duvander et al., 2010). Perhaps this is due to the fact 
that Norway hit its lowest fertility rate during the early 1980s—1.66. Incidentally, extensive 
family policy reforms in recent years seem to have played an important role in promoting 
fertility; as seen in Table 1-2, Norway currently marks 1.95, which is considered very high 
compared with the 19 OECD average at around 1.68. In addition, the literature indicates 
significant effects of family policy in promoting female employment as well; Norway currently 
maintains the highest female employment rate among 19 OECD countries—73%, along with 
Switzerland (see Lappergard, 2010). 
Denmark 
Denmark introduced two weeks of mandatory maternity leave for mothers working as 
factory workers in 1892 (Borchorst, 2006). This later became 12 weeks of maternity leave with a 
flat-rate payment in 1915, and it increased to 14 weeks in 1960 (Deven & Moss, 2002), though 
this leave was not job-protected (OECD, 2012b). Paid maternity leave of 14 weeks began to 
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apply to all groups of working women in 1966 (Borchorst, 2006). In 1980, maternity leave was 
extended to 18 weeks, albeit still not job-protected, at a payment rate of approximately 90%; 
moreover, in 1985, 10 weeks of parental leave, which could be shared with the father, were 
provided with a 90% payment rate, as well (OECD, 2012b; Pylkkanen & Smith, 2004; Wurtz 
Rasmussen, 2010). In 1989, mothers could now take job-protected maternity leave under the 
Directive on Equal Treatment in Denmark (OECD, 2012b). In the early 1990s, under the 
leadership of the Conservative Party, while the payment rates for both maternity and parental 
leave were reduced from 90% to 70%, 26 weeks of childcare leave were first introduced at the 
payment rate of approximately 72% (Gauthier, 2011b). Like in other Nordic countries, the 
Danish parental and childcare leave were created to support women who have given birth to a 
child and to provide the parents with more opportunities to equally care for their young children. 
Furthermore, gender-equitable labor force participation on a full-time and universal basis was 
also an important policy agenda in Denmark (OECD, 2002). In addition, another set of policy 
objectives was to target the issue of waiting lists for public childcare services, though the 
extension of leave policy did not bring the expected savings on public childcare (Rostgaard et al., 
1999). 
Throughout the 1990s, the economic downturn affected the Danish welfare system as 
much as it affected Finland and Sweden. Under the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, 
the dramatic welfare retrenchment took place in all aspects of the system, including leave policy. 
The payment rates for maternity, parental, and childcare leave were consistently reduced. Not 
only that, most local authorities stopped supplementing the basic leave payment (Rostgaard et al., 
1999). While the payment continued to fall, the duration of parental leave became extended from 
10 to 12 weeks, and two weeks of the father’s quota (reserved only for fathers—i.e., an 
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individual “take it or lost it” right) were established in 1998 (OECD, 2012b). However, these 
new additions did not last long. In 2002, although parental leave was lengthened from 12 weeks 
to 32 weeks with an approximate payment rate of 42% (note the reduction from 90% in 1985 to 
70% in the early 1990s, as mentioned above), the 26 weeks of childcare leave were completely 
abolished; moreover, the existing two-week father’s quota from 1998 became eliminated, as well 
(Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b). Currently, there is still no childcare leave in Denmark, and its 
18 weeks of maternity leave and 32 weeks of parental leave are provided with the same payment 
benefit. 
While the retrenchment on family leave policy seems dramatic, given that the changes 
took place within a relatively short period of time, compared with other OECD or EU countries, 
Denmark still provides extensive childcare services. The Danish childcare system relies almost 
completely on public providers, as it is well-known that most people do not approve of the idea 
of having commercial providers take of their children (Kremer, 2006). The system consists 
largely of formal family day care services, especially for very young children (childcare is 
accessible to almost all children from the age of 6 months); moreover, parents in Demark across 
all income levels have access to subsidized childcare, which facilitates their full-time labor force 
participation (OECD, 2002). 
Despite the economic downturn, childcare is one of the most crucial topics in the Danish 
social policy discourse. Indeed, its social expenditures on families are still one of the highest 
figures in both OECD and EU communities—3.9% of GDP, as seen in Table 1-3, whereas the 19 
OECD average stays at 2.3% of GDP. As seen in Table 1-2, Denmark also marks much higher 
for both female employment (71%) and fertility rate (1.87), whereas the 19 OECD average is 62% 
and 1.68 regarding female employment and fertility rates, respectively. Furthermore, as a 
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representative Social Democratic welfare state country, Denmark still enjoys the highest degree 
of gender equity in employment. Also interestingly, the government emphasizes the policy 
agenda, in which parents can have a “real choice” of whether they want to work while receiving 
high-quality childcare or whether they want to stay at home to take care of their young children 
(OECD, 2002). With the current financial and economic downturn, it would be interesting to see 




 a Nordic country and member of the EU, first introduced four weeks of 
maternity leave in 1917 for factory female workers after their childbirth, which became extended 
to six weeks for women who were working in trades or were working as officers; job protection, 
however, was not in effect until 1922 (OECD, 2012b; Valdimarsdottir, 2006). In 1964, the first 
paid maternity leave was introduced (three weeks before and six weeks after childbirth), among 
which the three weeks before birth were not job-protected, but the post-birth six weeks of leave 
included a payment rate of 0.15% of annual income per day (Gauthier, 2011b). The maternity 
leave became extended to 12 weeks in 1971, and job protection was provided (Kolberg, 1992). In 
1974, maternity leave became further extended to 29 weeks, to 33 weeks in 1978, and to 35 
weeks in 1979 (OECD, 2012b; Ronsen & Sundstrom, 2002). 
In 1980, maternity leave was reduced to 33 weeks; instead, 4.8 weeks of parental leave 
were introduced, which was extended to 9.6 weeks in 1981 (Deven & Moss, 2002; OECD, 
2012b). Throughout the 1980s, many changes took place in the Finnish leave system. While 
maternity leave was again reduced to 24.3 weeks, parental leave was extended to 20 weeks with 
an 80% payment rate (OECD, 2012b; Ronsen & Sundstrom, 2002). Beginning in the mid-1980s, 
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 Note that in the Finish system, days are converted in weeks, assuming six days per week for maternity leave and 
five days for parental leave (Gauthier, 2011b). 
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parental leave was further extended; while leave reserved exclusively for mothers was reduced to 
16.7 weeks at an 80% payment rate, parental leave overall increased from 20 weeks to 31.6 
weeks with the same 80% payment rate, which was available to fathers as well (Gauthier, 2011b). 
In addition, childcare leave (or homecare leave) was now offered at a flat rate payment to all 
parents until the child’s third birthday (2012b). 
In 1987, leave reserved exclusively for mothers was 17.5 weeks with the same parental 
and childcare leave provided; in 1991, parental leave was extended to 34 weeks, though the 
payment rates for both maternity and parental leave were reduced
12
 (Gauthier, 2011a; Ronsen & 
Sundstrom, 2002). In addition, payment for childcare leave decreased from the 1990s up to 
recent years; while the duration is the same (until the child’s third birthday), the current payment 
rate is approximately 12.8% (Gauthier, 2011b). The dramatic reduction in payment during leave 
within a rather short period of time perhaps has been mainly related to the fact that the economic 
downturn in the beginning of the 1990s was particularly severe in Finland, compared with its 
wealthy neighboring Scandinavian countries (OECD, 2005). 
As for paternity leave in Finland, with quickly growing women’s participation in the 
labor market, a new gender ideology was formed via young academics who demanded new 
gender roles in their society and suggested some type of paternity leave, which led to the first 
proposal on father’s leave in the Parliament in 1970 (Haataja & Nyberg 2006; Lammi-Askula & 
Takala, 2009). In 1978, paternity leave (“daddy days”) was first introduced, wherein fathers 
could use two weeks of leave at the time of the child’s birth, though it was taken from maternity 
leave and with the mother’s consent (Kolberg, 1992). Starting in the 1980s, the emphasis within 
the social policy discourse in reforming family leave policy began to shift more to fathers in 
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 Gauthier (2011b) noted that there are some contradictions among sources regarding the cash benefits paid 
during maternity and parental leave for the recent years. 
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Finland. However, while other Nordic countries were already achieving their goal to provide 
father’s leave as an individual “take it or lose it” right (e.g., father’s quota for parental leave in 
Norway in 1994, 1995 in Sweden, and 1999 in Denmark), Finland was not be able to do the 
same despite many attempts in the parliament (Lammi-Askula & Takala, 2009). The important 
issue regarding father’s leave in Finland was that the entitlement is only related to paternity leave, 
meaning that father’s leave is taken at the expense of the entire leave period. Even when 
paternity leave was first introduced in 1991 and was extended from two to three weeks in 1993, 
it was still the same for both occasions (Haataja, 2005; Haataja & Nyberg 2006). 
In the 2000s, the attention on work-life balance continued to increase in the policy 
discourse, as it did in other European countries. In the process of reforming the Employment 
Contract Act in 2003, it was agreed that a new bonus leave would be added to paternity leave 
and that a right to part-time parental leave should be established (OECD, 2012b); however, not 
many families have benefited from this part-time solution of sharing parental leave (Lammi-
Askula & Takala, 2009). 
It is now an interesting time to observe how the leave policy system in Finland will 
further evolve as the country continues to develop various options to give fathers more 
opportunities to be flexible in family responsibilities and earn money at the same time. In 2011, 
for instance, it was agreed that the possibility to use father’s leave would be extended until the 
child turned two (before, it was until the child turned 16 months old); moreover, while the 
duration of leave available for fathers remains the same, parental leave that can be shared 





Countries in Conservative Regime 
Conservative welfare countries currently provide about 14 to 16 weeks of fully paid 
maternity leave and partially paid parental leave. The regime used to include the Northern part of 
the Continental European countries, such as France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the 
Netherlands as well as Southern European countries, including Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece. 
However, there has been a significant divergence in family policy discourse between the two 
regions. Therefore, I discuss the two regions separately. Countries in the North are in the 
Conservative regime, whereas countries in the South are referred to as the Southern European 
regime. 
France 
In France, the promotion for family policy, especially for working parents, was boosted 
when the Socialist Party took power in the beginning of 1980; this, indeed, coincided with an 
increasing employment rate among mothers of young children and a falling fertility rate in the 
same time period. In fact, since the end of the 19
th
 century, France had already set the survival 
and welfare of children as one of its core social policy objectives, and it introduced eight weeks 
of unpaid maternity leave in 1909; 14 weeks with a 50% payment rate in 1946, which increased 
to a payment of 90% in 1971; and, finally, 16 weeks in 1978 (Fagnani & Math, 2009; OECD, 
2012b). However, France’s standing on social policy agenda still had its maternalistic approach. 
Unpaid parental leave, which could be taken from the end of maternity leave up to a maximum 
of two years of leave, was first introduced in 1977, but it was still a very traditional and mother-
oriented policy that was designed to achieve the goal of targeting children’s well-being; in 
addition, it was a leave entitlement that fathers could use only if the mother declined her right 
(Deven & Moss, 2002). 
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In 1981, however, with the arrival of the Socialist Party in power, its more gender-
egalitarian view on policy, along with the increasing political and economic mobilization of 
women’s rights, became manifested in family policy. The party promised 300,000 new places in 
public childcare centers or “crèches13” and paid parental leave that would be generous enough so 
that fathers would be able to take it, as well (Morgan, 2002). Indeed, the new government, in 
conjunction with the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales (CNAF, the National Family 
Allowance Office), a special branch of social security that is devoted to family policy in France, 
as well as other related organizations, such as the Haut Conseil de la Population et de la Famille 
(the High Council for Population and Family) and the Conference de la Famille (the Conference 
for the Family), immediately advocated and commissioned the major expansion of childcare 
services, and parental leave became more accessible for fathers nationwide (Fagnani & Math, 
2009). In 1985, the Child Rearing Benefit (APE, Allocation Parentale d’Education) was 
introduced for parents with three or more children with the youngest child not yet 3 years old, 
and it was accompanied by a flat rate benefit for parents (OECD, 2012b). However, in reality, 
the low rate payment during leave greatly discouraged most fathers from taking advantage of the 
leave, and families of smaller sizes were excluded. 
In the mid-1980s, the government made an effort to cut down on social expenditures on 
families in the face of growing social security costs. Though there had been a reform in 1987—
an extension of parental leave until the child’s third birthday, instead of two years (Gauthier, 
2011b)—with the low flat rate payment and restrictions on family size—i.e., parents with three 
or more children only—it still did not benefit many families.  
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 In the French terminology, “collective” childcare refers to crèches, or childcare centers, nearly all of which 
receive substantial public subsidies or are run by local governments. “Individual” models of childcare include 
family childcare (assistants maternelles) and nannies (Morgan, 2002). 
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Throughout the 1990s, an increase in the unemployment rate was one of the major social 
issues that needed to be addressed urgently; for instance, it rose from 8.9% in 1990 to 12.3% in 
1994 (Fagnani & Math, 2009). France, therefore, had to reinvent childcare policy as part of the 
national labor/economic policy to combat unemployment by helping families to have more 
individualized childcare solutions; for instance, the government provided subsidies to parents 
who hired childcare workers in the home as well as those who left the labor market to care for 
their own children, which would promote “free choice” (libre choix) for parents (Morgan, 2002). 
While on the surface, the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” promoted more opportunities for 
parents to balance their work and family responsibilities, the real (i.e., more urgent) underlying 
objective was about targeting high unemployment as well as the low fertility rate, which 
consistently declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s—for instance, from 1.95 in 1980 to 1.7 in 
1995. 
Indeed, in 1994, the government dramatically increased childcare allowances to support 
more families with children in meeting the costs of more individualized childcare 
arrangements—i.e., family child carers or nannies (Fagnani, 1998). The Child Rearing Benefit 
(APE) was extended to parents with two children (instead of three or more) who wanted to 
reduce their working hours or interrupt their career to take care of their children (Gauthier, 
2011b). These changes were, therefore, mainly to encourage employed parents, especially 
mothers, to discontinue working for three years in order to create the effects of increasing the 
rate of labor force participation, as women who do not work and receive the Child Rearing 
Benefit (APE) are not listed as job-seeking. Currently, France provides 16 weeks of maternity 
leave at a 100% payment rate and parental leave until the child is 3 years old as a family 
entitlement (Gauthier, 2011a). 
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In the last decade, besides an increasing unemployment rate, other social issues—such as 
gender inequality in access to formal childcare services, the quality of care services, and lack of 
qualified staff—have been considered high-priority social policy agendas both for economic 
reasons and as a result of feminist movements. In addition, as a member state of the EU and as 
one of the strongest economies in Europe, the French government demonstrated tremendous 
efforts in providing childcare services and benefits to support working families, especially 
women (Fine-Davis et al., 2004; Gornick & Meyers, 2004). Table 1-3 indicates that France’s 
social expenditures on families are much higher—3.2% of GDP—compared with the 19 OECD 
average of 2.3% and compared with other countries in the same Conservative welfare regime. 
However, overall, France still lags behind the family policy implemented in the 
Nordic/Scandinavia countries (Fagnani & Math, 2009). 
Belgium 
Belgium introduced the first paid maternity leave in 1894, including six weeks with 
payment at a flat rate; in 1958, the benefits equaled to about 60% of earnings for 12 weeks, 
which, again, were lengthened from 12 weeks to 14 weeks starting in 1970 with the same rate of 
payment benefit
14
 (Gauthier, 2011b). Moreover, two days of paid paternity leave were granted in 
1961 in Belgium, which were further extended to three days in 1963 (OECD, 2012b). In the mid-
1970s, the payment rate for maternity leave increased from 60% to 79.5%; moreover, in 1985, 
childcare leave as a program for “career interruptions” (or breaks) was introduced for workers to 
take up to 52 weeks with a 22.6% payment rate (Bruning & Plantenga, 1999; Gauthier, 2011a). 
This allowed workers to take paid leave, either full- or part-time, with job protection for a period 
of six months to one year, which can be renewed for up to five years; moreover, the worker on 
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leave must be replaced by another worker who is receiving full unemployment benefits 
(Marquez-Pereira & Paye, 2001). Therefore, while the leave for career interruptions has been 
understood as parental leave, the fundamental objective was to combat the urgent situation of 
economic crisis and high unemployment by encouraging part-time employment and flexible 
working hours (Morel et al., 2007). 
In the early 1990s, one more week was added to the existing 14 weeks of maternity leave 
with a reduced payment rate of 76.4%, and in 1998, three months of job-protected parental leave 
(or six months part-time leave) for each parent were introduced with a flat payment 
approximately equivalent to 23.3% (Gauthier, 2001b). In 2002, paternity leave was extended 
from three days to 10 days, wherein the first three days became mandatory with a 100% payment 
rate and up to an 82% payment rate for the rest of the leave period (OECD, 2012b). As of 2010, 
Belgium provides 15 weeks of maternity leave at a 76.9% payment rate, 26 weeks (13 weeks per 
parent) of parental leave, and 52 weeks of childcare leave. Indeed, while the Belgian family 
leave policy is known for its individualized and flexible system, the length of family leave policy 
is relatively short overall, and payment rates are low, especially compared with those benefits 
that are available in the neighboring countries (Maron et al., 2008). 
As for childcare services, Belgium took an early step toward a more egalitarian model, 
along with the Nordic countries and France (Mahon, 2002b). Table 1-3 indicates that among the 
Conservative countries, Belgium has a high level of social expenditures spent in families—2.8% 
of GDP, along with France and Austria, which is a noticeably higher figure compared with the 
OECD average of 2.3%. The country provides fairly high public childcare coverage for children 
aged 3 and above; in fact, Belgium and France are the two countries that have been standing out 
for some time for their efforts to provide public childcare services among the Conservative 
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welfare state countries, but also as having a similar mix of seemingly contradictory policies that 
provide both childcare services for working women and cash allowances for stay-at-home 
mothers (Morel et al., 2007). 
In recent years, Belgium, along with France (the French “freedom of choice” rhetoric as 
mentioned above), moved from a policy that promotes public childcare services for all children 
to a system that can support more private, individualized, and family forms of childcare; more 
state subsidies have been given for home-care services usually offered by “daycare mothers,” 
child-minders who look after children in their own homes alongside the nurseries
15
 (Kremer, 
2002; Morel et al., 2007). Therefore, the impact of family benefit provisions—the overall leave 
system that is relatively short, though it provides flexibility, and childcare system that tends to 
promote those in low-skilled and low-paid jobs (e.g., daycare mothers) to respond to the service 
sector needs, rather than promote high-quality jobs in the public sector—on issues including 
female employment and gender equity is still unclear. 
Germany 
Germany, like other developed European countries that have undergone many changes in 
family policy, has also moved toward setting a new trend and goal by introducing policy 
designed to help parents better balance their work and family responsibilities, especially since 
the unification of the former Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the former 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in 1990. While Germany is one of the 
representative countries of the Conservative regime, in which protection of the family has been 
understood as the key role of the state, rather than the emphasis on universal rights of the 
individual or the functions of free market, the recent reforms in family policy indicate that 
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 Unlike individuals working in day nurseries, daycare mothers who look after children at their homes require no 
formal training and are usually low-skilled and low-paid (Marquez-Pereira & Paye, 2001).  
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Germany is setting explicit policy objectives that offer women further opportunities to make 
choices in combining their work and family life and moving away from the traditional male 
breadwinner model, especially in terms of childcare and parental leave arrangements (Erler, 
2009). 
Prior to the unification, there were tremendous economic, political, social, and cultural 
disparities between West and East Germany. The two states had very contrasting models of work 
and family policy, as well. While the socialist East expected both mothers and fathers to work 
full-time, which led to the emergence of the dual earner, in the capitalist West, family policy was 
based on ideas of different but equal and complementary gender roles, which led to the 
development of the male breadwinner model (Leitner, Ostner, & Schmitt, 2008). The contrasting 
number of available childcare centers in the East and the West is a telling indicator of how the 
two states were based on different models of family policy; in 2007, only 8.1% of West German 
children under 3 years of age had a place in a nursery, against 37.4% in East Germany (Erler, 
2009). Therefore, what the German unification did was merge very contrasting models: the dual 
earner model of the socialist East and the male breadwinner model of the conservative-familist 
West (Leitner, Ostner, & Schmitt, 2008). Therefore, the welfare reforms that have been taking 
place after the unification were implemented to respond to the different needs of the two states as 
well as the various changes occurring in both the family and workforce—i.e., low fertility rate 
and increasing female employment. 
When the Red-Green Coalition
16
 took power in 1998 after 16 years of the Christian 
Democratic dominance, the new government began to swiftly move family policy away from 
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 The Red-Green Coalition comprises Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, which is a smaller party. Later, the 
Grand Coalition comprises Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) with three small parties, 
such as Greens.  
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West Germany’s male breadwinner model as female employment increased. The first step was 
when Germany went through the passage of the 2001 reform, in which policymakers put their 
attention on the expansion of childcare services and all-day schools. Erler (2009) provided a 
summary of what Germany has achieved in providing public childcare: (1) the 2001 reform 
legislation achieved the institution of a national all-day school fund in 2003 and the passage of a 
national law on the expansion of childcare services, specifically in West Germany where the 
availability lags far behind East Germany; (2) the declared aim of the new Child Support Law is 
to ensure a childcare place for 35% of all children under 3 years and a legal right to services for 
this age group by 2013
17
; and (3) a monthly care allowance for parents who opt to care for their 
young children at home was also agreed to be introduced by 2013 in order to respond to the 
socially conservative factions within the Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) of the Grand 
Coalition who criticized the discrimination of home care solutions. 
In addition to the expansion of public childcare services, leave policy has been further 
developed, as well. Throughout the 2005 election campaign, the earlier Christian Democrats’ 
proposal was dropped in favor of an Elterngeld proposal, which was designed to reduce the 
length of the interruptions of female employment due to child-related matters (Erler, 2009). The 
benefits included cash benefits as well as job-protected leave entitlements, and they were 
universal for all working mothers and fathers. Currently, maternity leave is 14 paid weeks (up to 
100% of wages), including parental leave up to 3 years, which used to be a flat-rate benefit for 
12 months or reduced payment for two years (Clearinghouse, 2008; Gauthier, 2011a). However, 
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 This goal is aligned with the EU Barcelona Childcare Targets, which aim that member states should remove 
disincentives to female labor force participation and strive, taking into account the demand for childcare facilities 
and remaining in line with national patterns of provision, to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children 
between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age (Plantenga, J., 
Remery, C., Siegel, M., & Sementini, L., 2008). 
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instead of the flat-rate benefit, the most recent parental policy provides those who are on leave 
with 67% of their previous earnings, which is more similar to the Nordic countries’ income 
maintenance scheme (Erler, 2009). In addition, the following benefits are added as well: (1) The 
government introduced a minimum benefit level of €300 regardless of prior employment history, 
a maximum benefit ceiling of €1,800, and a supplementary low-income element; (2) The length 
of leave payments became more flexible. Instead of 12 months, the childrearing benefit may be 
spread over 24 months (however, the monthly benefit level is reduced so that the overall 
payment remains the same); (3) Parents who were receiving a childrearing benefit could work up 
to 30 hours per week; and (4) The two “daddy months” were introduced, which are exclusively 
for fathers
18
 (Erler, 2009). 
Germany, therefore, represents the Conservative regime that used to be known as the 
male breadwinner model and is now setting its goal to move toward the Nordic system in 
providing a more generous and extensive family-friendly policy to respond to the needs and 
demands of working women in balancing work and family responsibilities. However, the country, 
having taken the lead to solve the EURO crisis in recent years, has its own budget issue to deal 
with. The government’s social expenditure on families is 2.1% of GDP, which is lower than the 
19 OECD average of 2.3%, as seen in Table 1-3. Furthermore, the country also tries to address 
the issue of its low fertility rate—1.3, an extremely low level even compared with its 
counterparts in the same Conservative regime, such as France and Belgium (2.0 and 1.8, 
respectively). 
Austria 
                                                          
18
 While the concept of “daddy months” also derived from the Social Democratic regime, unlike the Swedish system, 
where fathers have to choose “take it or lose it” at least two months of leave, the government introduced a “daddy 
bonus” (or father’s quota) that adds (not deducts) two months of leave to the standard 12-month leave period. 
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Austria already had four weeks of working restrictions for pregnant women in 1885 
(Wikander et al., 1995). In 1911, the first paid maternity leave was introduced with the same 
duration at a 60% payment rate; in the late 1950s, maternity leave became extended to 12 weeks 
with a 100% payment rate, and six months of additional leave was introduced at a 100% 
payment rate for single mothers and 50% for couples (Gauthier, 2011b). In the early 1960s, 
mothers could take job-protected maternity for 52 weeks, until the child’s first birthday, with the 
same payment rate (OECD, 2012b; Prskawetz et al., 2008). In 1974, maternity leave was 
extended to 16 weeks with the same 100% payment rate; however, the payment benefit for 
parental leave became flat-rated, which was about 2.000 ATS per month and 3.000 ATS for low-
income families, equivalent to a 37.6% payment rate (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b; Kamerman & 
Kahn, 1991; Prskawetz et al., 2008). 
In 1990, parental leave increased to 104 weeks with the same flat payment rate and job 
protection. In addition, fathers could take advantage of the leave entitlement after the first 16 
weeks of maternity; it was also possible for them to choose part-time leave (Kamerman & Kahn, 
1991; OECD, 2012b; Wikander et al., 1995). Beginning in the mid-1990s, the payment rates 
continued to decrease. The flat payment rate for parental leave was further decreased to 
approximately 27%, and the maximum leave for one parent was reduced to 18 months (78 
weeks), which means that the remaining 26 weeks or six months became the father’s quota 
(Gauthier, 2011b; Prskawetz et al., 2008). 
In 2002, the flat payment rate for parental leave was reduced again, but it was still job-
protected until the child’s second birthday (Gauthier, 2011b). In 2008, three leave options were 
introduced to provide more flexibility for parents to choose: (1) the long option of 436 euro per 
month (14.53 euro per day) for 30 months or for 36 months if both parents share the childcare 
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duties; (2) the mid-range option of 626 euro per month (20.80 euro per day) for 20 months or 24 
months); and (3) the short option of 800 euro per month (26.60 euro per day) for 15 months or 18 
months (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b). 
In 2010, even more options were added for flexible usage of leave for parents. In addition 
to the three options introduced in 2002, two more options were available: (4) 1,000 euro per 
month for 12 months or 14 months for low-income families; and (5) 80% of the net income for 
12 months or 14 months for low-income families (OECD, 2012b). As of 2010, Austria still 
provides 16 weeks of maternity leave with a 100% payment rate and 104 weeks of parental leave 
with a payment rate equivalent to approximately 18% (Gauthier, 2011b; ILO, 2010).  
For some time in Austria, one of the main leave policy objectives has been to provide 
more choices and options for parents. The Austrian system, compared with many other OECD 
countries, does provide more support for parents to balance both family and work responsibilities 
in their own terms by making various leave options as well as kindergartens and tax benefits 
available. This may be one reason that Austria maintains a high female employment rate, 66% in 
2010, as seen in Table 1-2, one of the highest in the 19 OECD countries. The employment rate 
for mothers with children aged 6-16 is also high at almost 75%; however, opening hours for 
kindergartens and schools do not usually facilitate full-time employment, and, thus, mothers who 
return to the workforce tend to change their employment to part-time positions (OECD, 2003). 
Therefore, while the Austrian system clearly puts tremendous efforts to accommodate families 
with more flexible leave options, it is still unclear whether parents are having real “free choices.” 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, it was 1889 when the regulation of four weeks of work restrictions for 
pregnant women was introduced (Wikander et al, 1995). In 1966, the first paid maternity leave 
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was introduced; moreover, the payment benefit became 100% of earnings in 1969, and leave was 
extended to 12 weeks with job protection (OECD, 2012b). In 1990, under the leadership of the 
Christian Democratic Party, maternity leave became extended from 12 weeks to 16 weeks, 
among which four prenatal weeks were mandatory (Plantenga & Remery 2009; Wikander et al., 
1995). In 1991, with the same political party in power, legislation was passed that entitled each 
parent to an unpaid part-time leave of six months (26 weeks per parent) under the Parental Leave 
Act, which was non-transferrable and could be taken until the child’s eighth birthday; the Dutch 
parents in two-adult families now had the opportunity to take leave simultaneously for a six-
month period while both working on a part-time basis and taking care of the child (OECD, 2002). 
In 2009, again under the Christian Democratic Party, the payment benefit during leave was 
introduced in the form of a tax relief (at about 25% earnings), which was equivalent to a flat rate 
payment of approximately €667 per month (Gauthier, 2011b; Moss & Korintus, 2008). As of 
2010, the country still provides 16 weeks of maternity leave paid at a 100% payment rate and 26 
weeks per parent of parental leave at about 25%. 
The Netherlands also began to provide paternity leave in 2001 where fathers were 
entitled to two days of childbirth leave, fully paid and job protected, with no ceiling and paid by 
employers under the Work and Care Act (OECD, 2012b). Since 2005, the Act has been extended, 
allowing all employees to take unpaid leave in order to care for terminally ill family members for 
up to six times the weekly number of working hours, though this long-term compassionate leave 
is not a statutory right (Plantenga & Remery, 2009). In 2011, under the leadership of the 
People’s Party of Freedom and Democracy (“VVD”), a law on modernizing family leave policy 
and working hours was passed to create more flexibility in parental leave, which would extend 
the entitlement to employees who had just started a new job as well as to offer more short- and 
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long-term care leave arrangements for family members other than a child or partner. In addition, 
in 2012, more employee-friendly protection measures were introduced, especially related to 
working times; for instance, an employee can now ask the employer for a temporary change of 
working hours after he or she has used up the designated leave entitlements (OECD, 2012b). 
For a long time, the Dutch family policy, including family leave arrangements, overall 
has been very limited compared with other European countries. Childcare services, particularly 
for very young children, are considerably limited or expensive if unsubsidized, which helps to 
explain the reason that Dutch mothers with children are more likely to be working part-time or 
out of the labor market; in addition, parents of younger children often rely on informal care 
solutions (Kremer, 2002; OECD, 2002). The government has generally emphasized individual 
parents’ assuming responsibilities in childcare, rather than the state being directly involved in 
family and work matters (Plantenga & Remery, 2009). 
The Dutch part-time work solutions—allowing part-time employees to have equal rights 
as full-time workers in family benefits, childcare supports, and taxation—played a significant 
role in the development of family policy (OECD, 2002). While the effects of such solutions on 
various outcomes (for instance, child welfare or the gender gap), remain unclear so far, it seems 
that the country as a whole did witness a dramatic increase in both female employment and 
fertility rates. For instance, in the beginning of the 1970s, female employment rate was at about 
30% in the Netherlands, and its fertility rate was at the lowest in the early 1980s at 1.47. 
However, as seen in Table 1-2, the country now marks 70% and 1.8 for female employment and 
fertility rates, respectively (Gauthier, 2011a). These figures of both female employment and 
fertility rates in the Netherlands are comparable to those of the Nordic countries, such as Finland 
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(67% and 1.9, female employment and fertility rates, respectively) and Denmark (71% and 1.9, 
female employment and fertility rates, respectively). 
Since the beginning of family policy development, the debates around family leave 
policy in the Netherlands have mainly come from the efforts to understand the exact costs and 
benefits of maintaining and promoting the overall employment rate (either full-time or part-time). 
Even the recent policy agenda emphasizes the importance of maintaining and increasing female 
employment, which has become a driving force behind all benefit extensions and 
individualization; this is based on the premise that family leave policy as well as childcare 
services would help parents, especially mothers, to maintain their employment statuses and to 
balance family and work responsibilities (Kremer, 2002). Perhaps as a result, the country has the 
highest level of part-time employment among men and women in the EU and OECD community 
(Plantenga & Remery, 2009); however, the long-term effects of such a policy approach on 
various social and economic outcomes have yet to be further examined. 
 
Countries in Southern European Regime 
Up until the 1980s to 1990s, countries of the Southern European regime—such as Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and Greece—had shared many similar characteristics with other Continental 
European countries; therefore, they used to be regarded as the same Conservative regime, which 
is usually characterized by its male breadwinner model in family policy. As discussed previously, 
the traditional family values and gender roles are regarded as the widely accepted social, cultural, 
and religious norms and, thus, receive support from the government. However, rather than 
actively responding to the changes taking place in family and workforce and the needs of 
working women as their Northern counterparts did (e.g., France and Germany), the Southern 
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European countries have been characterized by a high degree of fragmentation within their 
welfare state, and no national level statutory income scheme has been guaranteed for working 
families, along with mixed universal and private services and benefits (Gauthier, 2002). Indeed, 
countries under this regime overall provide lower levels of support compared with other 
developed European countries. The problems are often known to come from various imbalances 
that exist within the welfare system as well as social and cultural institutions. Disparities and 
differences across regions, generations, and genders in numerous institutions (e.g., marriage, 
family, and workforce), few resources provided for childcare, and no commitment to create new 
family-friendly policies have been recognized (Sala, 2002). 
Spain 
Spain’s social expenditures on families mark 1.5% of GDP in 2010, which is much lower 
than the 19 OECD average—2.3%, as seen in Table 1-3. In Spain, parental leave is characterized 
by being very generous in terms of duration but not in financial terms; the country currently 
provides 16 weeks of maternity leave at a 100% payment rate and unpaid parental leave until the 
child is 3 years old. Spain shares a number of characteristics with other Southern European 
countries, such as Italy and Portugal: a very low fertility rate of 1.39 and a female employment 
of 52% in 2010, as seen in Table 1-2, which is a significant contrast to the 19 OECD countries’ 
average of fertility and female employment rates—1.68 and 62%, respectively. 
Spain’s first paid maternity leave was introduced in 1929 when the country ratified the 
1919 International Labor Organization Maternity Protection Convention; it was 12 weeks of 
partially paid leave (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). Under the Franco’s era, 1939–1974, while there 
had been some extension efforts for paid maternity leave—for instance, the payment rate 
increased up to 60% in 1958 and 75% in 1966—there was an authoritarian family policy that 
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overall discouraged the employment of women, especially ones who were married, and promoted 
a male single-earner model, even though the economy made it unsustainable. The low level of 
supports in a slow economy led many men to take a second job and mothers to work an informal 
job to make ends meet (Wall & Escobedo, 2009). 
In 1975, with the collapse of the Franco regime, Spain’s new democratic era began. 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Suarez (1976–1982), Spain first established the principle 
of equality among all men, women, and children through the Spanish Constitution of 1978, 
which was manifested in the reform of the Civil Code in 1981. Paid maternity leave was 
extended to 14 weeks with the same 75% payment rate in 1976; moreover, the first unpaid 
childcare leave was introduced to be taken until the child is 3 years of age, which still remains 
the same (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). This coincides with the fact that, in Spain, while the 
provision of free educational preschool programs for children who are 3 years old and older has 
been the state responsibility, especially since the 1970s and 1980s (and they did create a 
considerably ample supply), taking care of younger children still falls in the family domain and 
is considered a private matter (Valiente, 2002).
 19
 While the government focuses more on new 
formal rights—such as work, divorce, and abortion—in recent decades, the traditional gender 
roles have still been strongly perceived and implied in the Spanish society. 
Going back to leave policy, under the leadership of the Socialist Party from the early 
1980s to the mid-1990s, with policy priorities on health, education, and employment, the 
government extended maternity leave to 16 weeks in 1989 following the EU accession in 1986, 
and in 1994, the payment rate finally increased to 100% (Wall & Escobedo, 2009). Next, the 
Conservative Party came into power in 1996, the Socialist Party in 2004, and then the 
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 The lack of childcare support for younger children (age 0-3) is commonly found in all Southern European 
countries; however, the provision for free educational programs for older children is known to be well established.  
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Conservative Party again in 2011. Throughout the past two decades under both parties, some 
changes in family policy have been made both at the local and national levels (Naldini & Jurado, 
2013). For instance, since 2000, some regions have implemented a flat-rated payment benefit in 
order to stimulate the low take-up rates of full-time parental leave in Spain; five regions provide 
allowances between €200 (about 263 USD) per month in the Basque Country and €560 (about 
736 USD) per month in Castilla y León though for low-income families only. Furthermore, in 
2007, the Law on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men increased social security 
benefits linked to parental leave from one year to 2 years, though in reality, it was usually unpaid; 
therefore, male breadwinners and parents who needed two salaries were still reluctant to take 
leave. 
Spain introduced a 15-day fully paid paternity leave in 2007, whose take-up rate is 
currently around 80% (Naldini & Jurado, 2013). This is a national level provision. While there 
have been many efforts to meet the mandates of the evolving Spanish Civil Code for gender 
equity as well as responding to the unique needs and demands of working families, Spain still 
lags in introducing and implementing consistent family services and benefits nationwide for 
working parents, especially mothers. Furthermore, the current financial crisis that is worsening, 
especially in South Europe, greatly reinforces the austerity measures the government carries out, 
which consequentially affects the distribution and scope of social expenditures on families. 
Portugal 
Portugal spent about 1.5% of GDP for social expenditures on families in 2010, lower than 
the OECD average of 2.3%. The country, compared with other Southern European countries 
(Spain and Italy, 52% and 46%, respectively), has a high female employment rate of 61% and a 
similarly low fertility rate of 1.32 as of 2010, as seen in Table 1-2. Like other countries in this 
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regime, Portugal is characterized as the traditional male breadwinner model (Crompton, 1999) 
and a nation of families (Chesnais, 1996), where women usually do not work outside of the home 
when they have young children (Flaquer, 2000; Wall, 2004). 
The fact that the country was under a longtime dictatorship is something that is also 
similar to Spanish history. After a military coup in 1926, Salazar (1932–1968) came into power 
with the radical right-wing and anti-liberal Catholicism, which was enforced to further affirm the 
traditional hierarchy of society and family—i.e., male breadwinner head of family, subordinate 
wife, and obedient children. After the collapse of the Salazar regime, Portugal provided 60 days 
of paid maternity leave at a 100% payment rate in 1969, albeit with various restrictions (OECD, 
2012b). 
The revolution in 1974 was a major turning point for family policy. Maternity leave was 
extended to 90 days at a 100% payment rate in 1976 with a focus on the importance of work for 
women’s emancipation and women’s place in the labor market. In 1984, a law introduced 
parental leave and other changes, which established the family entitlement of either parent to 
unpaid leave for six months after maternity leave; however, the leave entitlement did not include 
job protection (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b; OECD, 2012b). 
Throughout the 1990s, under the leadership of the Socialist Party, there have been a 
number of reforms in family policy. In 1995, maternity allowance was paid for 98 days, 60 days 
of which had to be taken after the childbirth, and in 1999, the duration of leave increased to 110 
days at a 100% payment rate; moreover, in the same year, two policy measures for fathers were 
introduced—five fully paid working days of paternity leave and 15 consecutive days fully paid to 
be taken after maternity leave (OECD, 2012b). The development of childcare facilities during 
this period also had considerable effects on working families; in the 1990s, only one in every 
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four mothers stayed at home to take care of their children under 2 years of age, whereas half of 
all mothers did so previously (Wall, 2004). 
In the last decade, again with the Socialist Party in power, there have been additional 
expansion efforts in family policy. Maternity leave was extended to 120 days at a 100% payment 
rate, and three months of unpaid parental leave per parent was introduced (Gauthier, 2011a; 
2011b). In addition to leave policy and childcare services, the Portuguese social policy priority 
was also given to expanding pre-school education for children who are 3 to 6 years old, and the 
coverage dramatically increased from 55% in 1995 to 78% in 2002 (Wall & Escobedo, 2009). In 
2003, parental leave on a part-time basis was also extended from six to 12 months, and the leave 
could be taken on a full-time basis for three months or on a half-time basis for a period of 12 
months per parent (Moss & Korintus, 2008). Furthermore, in 2009, parental leave was finally set 
at 120 days at a 100% payment rate (or 150 days at 80%), and paternity leave was made 
mandatory for 10 working days paid at 100% , which was to be used within the first month 
following childbirth (OECD, 2012b).  
Italy 
Despite numerous fast and dramatic social and economic changes taking place over the 
last decades, the Italian public continues to show a very strong sense of connection and 
obligation to family, as an example of a nation of families (Chenais, 1996). For instance, as for 
the share of young adults aged 25-34 living with their parents in 2010, Italy and Spain marked 
around 45% and 37%, respectively, whereas France and Sweden showed only about 12% and 5%, 
respectively (Naldini & Jurado, 2013). The current economic crisis that is hitting Italy especially 
hard further reinforces this phenomenon. During this difficult time period, the support that young 
people receive from their parents gives further rise to strong intergenerational moral obligations; 
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in fact, most people in Italy and Spain are more willing to care for older family members 
compared with other OECD countries in the Western world (Albertini et al., 2007). 
Italy is known for its lack of state provision of family-related services, deeply rooted 
gender inequality, and various unstable economic conditions; these factors greatly contribute to 
women’s staying home to take care of family members rather than looking for employment 
opportunities in the labor market (Bettio & Villa, 1998). In addition, while well-established 
public childcare/pre-school settings are available for older children, the early childhood 
education and care system lag behind other European countries, which is commonly shared in 
the Southern European welfare regime. The policy discourse mainly focuses on protecting 
traditional family values, rather than promoting gender equality in family and workforce, and 
mothers are encouraged to stay home for the welfare of their children. The public view on female 
employment and child well-being is also interesting in Italy. The view that maternal employment 
is potentially harmful to children predominates. In fact, compared with Sweden, France, and 
even Spain, in Italy, there is much more agreement on the belief that a pre-school child is more 
likely to suffer if his or her mother works; about 2/3 of Italians are concerned about the possible 
negative impact of maternal employment on children across generations (Naldini & Jurado, 
2013). 
Indeed, the country has the lowest female employment rate—46%—among 19 OECD 
countries and one of the lowest fertility rates—1.4 in 2010, as seen in Table 1-2. The family and 
child allowances are still among the least generous in Europe, providing income-tested or 
employment-related cash benefits only (Clearinghouse, 2008). In addition, social expenditures 
on families are only about 1.6% of GDP, similar to other Southern European countries, but much 
lower compared with the 19 OECD average of 2.3%, which is demonstrated in Table 1-3. 
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The Italian welfare state was shaped by the dynamics of party competition, and it was a 
tool to develop social capital and redistribute wealth among citizens. At the same time, it was 
used to distribute rewards to mobilize support for particular political agendas, as well. For 
instance, when the Social Democratic Party took power from directly after World War II until 
1980, the government made sure to use the welfare expansion not only to deal with the market 
failure, but also to accommodate a wide range of political interests (Sala, 2002). Indeed, with 
few positive labor market strategies and a fragmented welfare system, Italy had the least 
generous support for job training and skill development for ordinary workers among 19 OECD 
countries (Negrelli, 1997). 
In Italy, four weeks of maternity leave with a lump-sum payment benefit were first 
introduced in 1919; the payment rate later increased to 80% of earnings payable for eight weeks 
for agricultural salary workers and 13 weeks for other industries in 1958, which again increased 
to 21 weeks in 1961 (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). However, not much was done to realistically 
support working families and women who were participating in the labor market until the 1970s 
(Saraceno, 1998). In 1972, five compulsory months of maternity leave were introduced with job 
protection and an 80% payment rate; in the following year, paid parental leave was first 
introduced at a 30% payment rate, although it was only available to women until 1977 (OECD, 
2012b). 
Italy currently provides about 21.7 weeks of paid maternity leave with an 82% payment 
rate and the additional 44 weeks of job protected paid parental leave (Gauthier, 2011b). However, 
with the ongoing economic crisis, while the government tries to better cope with the needs of 
changing dynamics within family and workface, the future of the Italian welfare state and its 





Greece shares many similar issues and problems with other Southern European countries. 
First, along with Italy, as seen in Table 1-2, the country has one of the lowest female 
employment rates as well as a very low fertility rate (48% and 1.4, respectively), in great contrast 
to the 19 OECD average (62% and 1.68, respectively). Moreover, the social expenditures 
dedicated to families are only 1.4% of its GDP, among the lowest as seen in Table 1-3. Moreover, 
the current economic crisis is especially harsh on the country, as the government is in a position 
in which it must continue its austerity measures in order to survive through the Euro Crisis. Thus, 
further welfare retrenchment is expected in upcoming years. 
Greece had a system wherein pregnant women were not allowed to work in 1910; in 1921, 
the 1919 ILO Convention began to apply to women working in manufacturing, construction, 
transport, and commerce where 12 weeks of job protected paid leave were provided (Wikander 
et al., 1995). The payment rate was 33% in 1934 and increased to 50% in 1958 (Gauthier, 2011b). 
In 1977, 12 weeks of maternity leave were provided with a full payment benefit and became job-
protected in 1982 (OECD, 2012b). Maternity leave continued to extend until it became 17 weeks 
in the early 2000s, which is the current provision with a full 100% payment rate (ILO, 2010). In 
addition, 26 weeks (13 weeks per parent) of unpaid but job-protected parental leave were 
introduced in 1984, which became extended to 30.5 weeks (about 15.2 weeks per parent) in 1998 
(OECD, 2012b). 
In 2002, two days of fully paid paternity leave were introduced (Moss & Korintus, 2008). 
In 2004, breastfeeding breaks began to be converted to 3.75 months of paid leave, at a maximum 
of one hour per day for two years or two hours per day for one year; though fully paid, it was not 
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protected as a statutory right (OECD, 2012b). In 2008, six months (26 weeks) of special job-
protected maternity leave were introduced wherein working mothers were entitled to an 
additional six-month period of special maternity protection leave, after the expiry of their 
confinement leave and the reduced working hours leave (Eurofound, 2008); it became 
transferrable to the father and paid at the minimum wage agreed in the National General 
Collective Labour Agreement (Moss & Korintus, 2008). 
Under the tremendous pressure of the current economic crisis, high unemployment, and 
ongoing austerity measures taking place in the country, the government tries to provide sufficient 
support for working families, promote the fertility rate, and, above all, recover its employment 
rate and economy. However, the effects of leave provided in Greece (i.e., the emphasis on 
extending leave duration without sufficient payment benefits) can have various consequences on 
issues, such as the female employment rate. For instance, such policy measures can lead to 
women’s reducing their working hours or participating in informal economic activities, which is 
related to issues of gender equity both at home and in the workforce, as well as the quality of 
employment opportunities for them. The consistent theme of extended weeks of leave without 
much improvement on payment benefits can be found in a new law passed in 2012 incorporating 
the EU 2010/18 Directive on Parental Leave
20
 both in public and private sectors (OECD, 2012b): 
(1) Parental leave is extended so it can be taken until a child was 6 years old; 
(2) Parental leave lasts 4 months instead of 3.5 months as in the past; 
(3) Requests for parental leave from parents of children with a disability or long-term 
illness or sudden illness and from single parents are dealt with as an absolute priority; 
(4) In the case of death of a parent or total removal or parental responsibility or non-
recognition of the child, the other parent can receive the double amount of parental 
leave; 
(5) Working people that adopt or foster a child younger than age 6, are entitled to 
parental leave which can be extended until the child’s eighth birthday; and 
(6) Special leave was introduced to cover the unplanned and serious needs of parents 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:068:0013:0020:EN:PDF  
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whose children suffered from serious illness needing regular therapy or 
hospitalization. 
 
As for childcare support, as seen in other Southern European countries, despite the 
increasing demands and needs for early childhood education and care services with a number of 
socio-economic changes taking place in the family and workforce over the last four decades, the 
availability of such services continues to be rather limited compared with other European 
countries; moreover, relevant research on childcare for children under 3 years of age is almost 
nonexistent in Greece (Petrogiannis, 2010). For instance, it has been reported that 110,000 
children aged between 5 months and 5 years, who consist of the 20% of the population of this 
particular age group, attend one of the only 3,000 nurseries available (Petrogiannis, 2010). While 
kindergartens (the pre-primary educational system for children ages 5 and 6) are compulsory, in 
Greece, the demands for high-quality early childhood education and care are regarded as a 
luxury, rather than a necessity (Petrogiannis, 2006; Petrogiannis & Melhuish, 1996). Moreover, 
with regard to research for children under age 3, the issues of childcare services and care quality 
have been extremely under-studied, mostly due to the lack of necessary information and 
available data nationwide (Melhuish & Petrogiannis, 2006). Overall, as the country experiences a 
great deal of persistent economic and social instability, it is questionable how those leave policy 
reforms, along with the extremely limited child support services and dramatic welfare 
retrenchment, will impact working families.  
 
Countries in Liberal Anglo-Saxon Regime 
English-speaking Liberal welfare countries, except the US,
21
 also provide both maternity 
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 While the US is one of the representative countries of the Liberal model, along with the UK and Ireland, I note 
that, in terms of family policy, other Liberal welfare countries have undergone considerable reforms in the last 
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and parental leave; for instance, the UK provides 78 weeks of total leave, of which 39 weeks of 
maternity leave is paid, and, though not included in this study, Canada provides 52 weeks with 




The United States 
In the United States, the 12 weeks of job-protected unpaid family/medical leave for 
qualifying employees in a large company (50 or more employees) are provided under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) passed in 1993. However, no federal paid leave entitlement and 
no family or child allowance exist. Employees, therefore, mostly rely on their employers for 
maternity leave or other forms of benefit for pregnancy (Waldfogel, 1999). Prior to the FMLA, 
Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) laws were enacted, which protected workers from 
temporary non-job-related medical disabilities, including pregnancy, but only in five states 
(California, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii).
23
 As a result of these TDI laws, 
companies in those five states were required to provide paid leave to new mothers equivalent to 
benefits for other ill or temporarily disabled employees (Wisensale, 2001).  
Many states implemented their own State Family Leave Acts before the federal mandate, 
but these laws do not provide paid leave. For instance, in 1987, nine states had unpaid maternity 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decades. For instance, countries such as Australia and the UK have been actively undergoing the process of 
developing a more family-friendly  policy, especially for childcare and education. Though not covered in my study, 
Australia also developed a child care system more in keeping with that of the Social Democratic countries than the 
lack of national support exemplified in countries like the US. The system was built around the principle of quality, 
affordability, and accessibility (Brennan, 2007; 2009). 
22
 While categorized under the Liberal regime in Esping-Andersen (1990), Switzerland was discussed as a hybrid for 
its welfare feature that fits in both Liberal and Conservative models. Other countries that were characterized with 
dual welfare features were Austria (Social Democratic and Conservative, Belgium (Social Democratic and 
Conservative), and Ireland (Liberal and Conservative).The latter two countries, along with Switzerland, were no 
longer included in Esping-Andersen (1999), whereas Austria continued to be regarded as Conservative welfare state 
(Ebbinghaus, 2012). 
23
 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2011/tempdisability.pdf  
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leave laws, and another 14 states provided maternity (three states) or parental (11 states) leave 
two years later (OECD, 2012b). Currently, job-protected maternity leave is provided in 20 states; 
moreover, 10 states, including the District of Columbia, have laws that give at least some male 
workers job-protected paternity leave. Some states have enacted paid family leave; the length of 
paid leave varies from four to 18 weeks. For instance, California passed a mandate for six weeks 




Interestingly, in the case of the US, though the provision of family-friendly policies is 
minimal, its female employment remains high relative to other OECD countries. While it is 
paradoxical, various factors push women to the labor force, such as the lack of alternatives to 
income from employment and the need for health insurance, which employers usually cover, as 
well as the emphasis on work in a political and cultural context. Others explained that it is 
perhaps due to the relatively well-enforced anti-discrimination laws in the labor market as well 
as the welfare reform in 1996 (from welfare to work
25
) that required thousands of women on 
welfare to be employed (Levy & Michel, 2002). Furthermore, the high female employment rate 
                                                          
24
 Following California and New Jersey, the state of Washington passed a paid family leave law in 2007. It was to 
take effect in October, 2009; however, in 2009, the Legislature passed a law delaying the implementation of the law 
until 2012 (due to state budgetary constraints). In the 2011 legislative session, the legislature voted to further delay 
the implementation of the paid family leave law until 2015 (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 
2012). In addition, Minnesota, Montana, and New Mexico have active At-Home Infant Care policies providing low-
income working parents who choose to have one parent stay home for the first year of a newborn’s or adopted 
child’s life with cash benefits offsetting some portion of the wages forgone (Thevenon & Solaz, 2013). 
25
 In 1996 under the Clinton administration, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
(PRWORA) was passed, and the country began a major reform of its social assistance program for single mothers 
and low-income parents, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC focused on supporting 
families to care for their children at home, whereas the new program required many to seek paid employment within 
a certain period of time and set a time limit for receiving the assistance. Changes were accompanied by expansions 
of work support programs for low-income families, including federal and state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC), 
childcare subsidies, child tax credits, and Medicaid, and child health insurance program; overall, the welfare 
reform, in conjunction with the strong economy in the 1990s, did result in dramatic declines in welfare caseloads 
and increases in single mother employment (Neeraj et al., 2006; Waldfogel, 2008). For more detailed overviews on 
the US welfare reform, see Blank (2002), Grogger et al. (2002), and Moffitt (2007). 
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in the US is accompanied by a high fertility rate (in fact, the US maintains an ideal rate – 2.1, as 
seen in Table 1-2, whereas the average of 19 OECD countries is only 1.68 in 2010); therefore, 
the US may not have much incentive to provide generous family supports for demographic- or 
labor market-related reasons, compared with other OECD countries. 
As for childcare services, the US provides two sets of care—private or public. This 
duality in the childcare system has created deep disparities in service quality, accessibility, and 
affordability nationwide (Levy & Michel, 2002). Indeed, the lack of early childhood education 
and care (ECEC) in the US is well-known; kindergartens for 5-years-olds are universal (98%), 
but enrollment is 78% for children between ages 3 and 5 years old and only 38.4% for children 
under 3 years old, and the fees vary enormously, as tremendous disparities exist between public 
and private childcare services both in quality and price (Kamerman, 2009). Therefore, depending 
on the economic situation of parents, obtaining early care for children can be a great challenge.
26
 
As an additional note, an important feature of the US is that the country did not have a 
national healthcare system until 2009 when the Affordable Health Care passed under the Obama 
administration,
27
 whereas all of the other OECD countries did. This is an important issue because 
it implies that parents in the US are responsible for a significant portion of medical expenses for 
their family members and children. With an economic slowdown and high unemployment, more 
families face this hardship. For instance, in 2010, while in all of the other 18 OECD countries, 
more than 99% of the population was covered under public health insurance, except Germany 
(89.2% public and 10.8% private), in the US, only 26.4% of the population was covered by 
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 To target this issue, during the President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Great Society Head Start was born as public 
program of early education for the poor, and its educational value has been demonstrated. See, for example, Puma 
et al. (2010) and Vogel et al. (2013).  
27
 Historically, the efforts to pass the universal health care were in action in the US. Recently, under the Clinton 
Administration (1993-2000), the Health Security Act was introduced, but it failed to pass. Under the Bush 
Administration (2001-2008), the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act passed in 2003, 
while the US National Health Care Act of 2007 and Healthy Americans Act in 2007 and 2009 failed.  
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public health insurance, and 54.9% was covered with private insurance (primary only); 
approximately 19% of the population did not have any (OECD Stat Extracts). This, needless to 
say, most likely impacts child health. 
 
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom already had maternity leave in 1911, which included four weeks of 
payment with a lump sum (Gauthier, 2011b); this was extended to 13 weeks in the late 1940s, 
and again to 18 weeks with a flat payment rate in the 1950s (OECD, 2012b; Zabel, 2009). In 
1975, the Employment Protection Act introduced the right for women to have up to 29 weeks of 
leave after childbirth; payment was provided for 18 weeks only, including six weeks paid at 90% 
of earnings and the remaining 12 weeks with a flat rate allowance for qualified mothers (OECD, 
2012b). In 1999, parents with children under five years old were now each entitled to up to 13 
weeks of unpaid leave (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). 
Paid maternity leave was further extended from 18 weeks to 26 weeks in 2003 with a 
similar payment scheme, 90% of earnings for the first six weeks and a flat rate for the remaining 
20 weeks; moreover, 26 weeks of additional unpaid maternity leave was added along with 
paternity leave for two weeks at a flat-rate payment benefit (OECD, 2012b). In 2007, the 
duration of maternity leave remained the same as before (52 weeks), but the payment scheme 
changed; the paid portion of leave for mothers increased from 26 weeks to 39 weeks with 90% of 
earnings for 6 weeks and a flat payment for the remaining 33 weeks (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 
2012b). In 2009, additional paternity leave and payments were introduced, which allowed fathers 
to take up to six months of leave during the child’s first year if the mother decided to go back to 
work before using up her maternity leave (OECD, 2012b). Therefore, currently, the UK provides 
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39 weeks of paid maternity leave (90% for 6 weeks and a flat rate payment for the remaining 33 
weeks) and 26 weeks of unpaid parental leave (Gauthier, 2011b). 
As for childcare support, government involvement in childcare provision has been quite 
minimal; however, when the Labour government came into power in 1997, the government 
pledged in its electoral manifesto to develop the National Childcare Strategy to increase public 
support for childcare through a combination of means (Randall, 2002). Since then, providers 
have been encouraged to increase the supply of childcare facilities with direct government 
subsidies in more vulnerable areas; the Sure Start Initiative,
28
 established in 1998, became a 
centerpiece of the UK anti-poverty policy with its objective of improving the well-being of 
families and giving children the best possible start in life (OECD, 2005). Under the theme of 
“work for those who can, security for those who cannot,” reducing child poverty was an explicit 
policy goal in the UK welfare reform in 1998,
29
 which intended: (1) to promote paid work and 
make work pay; (2) to raise incomes for low-income families with children; and (3) to directly 
invest in children (Waldfogel, 2008).  
When it comes to children of ages 3 and 4, universal education began in the 1990s. In the 
midst of heightened party competition during the 1992 general election campaign, both the 
Liberal and the Labour parties emphasized their commitment to providing the universal 
education for children of ages 3 and 4. In 1993, the new Conservative government also endorsed 
the goal of universal provision for preschool children and piloted a nursery voucher scheme, 
where parents of 4-year-olds were provided with vouchers worth 1100 pounds toward the cost of 
education, either public or private (Randall, 2002). When the Labour government was elected in 
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For more details on recent evaluations of Sure Start, see Melhuish et al. (2010). 
29
For more details of the welfare reform, see Brewer (2008) and Hills & Waldfogel (2004). 
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1997, they moved toward fully universal provision, instituting free universal preschool for 3- and 
4-year-olds.  
This major policy shift—from a program that targets a certain type of children and 
families based on their income levels to a program that promotes the universal care for all—
indicates that the UK is moving more toward the Social Democratic childcare model, which also 
happened in other countries of the Liberal welfare state, such as Australia. Furthermore, when it 
comes to social expenditures on families, the UK shows its increasing support and commitment 
in investing in families and children. The total public expenditures spent on families in the UK as 
seen in Table 1-3 are one of the highest figures—3.8%—even compared with countries under the 
Social Democratic welfare regime.  
Ireland 
In Ireland, social policy for families with young children has been known for its absence 
of direct government intervention (OECD, 2003). It was 1913 when the country introduced four 
weeks of maternity leave with a lump-sum payment benefit, which became 12 weeks in the 
1950s, though it was still not job-protected (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b). The Unfair 
Dismissal Act of 1977 stated that a dismissal due to pregnancy was unfair, unless the employee 
could not do the work or comply with some other statute, there was no suitable alternate work for 
her, or she refused such work, if offered (OECD, 2012b). In 1981, under the Maternity 
Protection Act, expecting mothers were entitled to 14 weeks of paid maternity leave with job 
protection (Gauthier, 2011a). In 1998, under the Parental Leave Act, 14 unpaid and job protected 
weeks of leave for each parent were introduced (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b). Paid maternity leave 
was extended from 14 weeks to 18 weeks in 2001 (OECD, 2012b). In 2006, under the Parental 
Leave Amendment Act, paid maternity leave was extended to 22 weeks with additional 12 weeks 
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of unpaid maternity leave and again to 26 weeks of paid maternity leave with an additional 16 
unpaid weeks (Moss & Korintus, 2008). 
While childcare issues have been at the center of the social policy discourse in most of 
the developed countries over the last decades, the active discussions on childcare services have 
just developed in Ireland. It was only in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Ireland took its first 
step to prioritize the expansion of formal center-based childcare services over home-based 
informal paid services to respond numerous changes taking place in family and the workforce 
(Murphy-Lawless, 2000). Prior to the recent active childcare expansion initiatives, the concern 
for childcare had mainly belonged to the domain of the Catholic Church and family, and state 
intervention was neither needed nor desired
30
 (Kennedy, 2001). However, with the numerous 
child abuse allegations both within the family and religious/voluntary environments, an 
increasing female employment rate, and the lack of informal childcare services (both in quantity 
and quality), Ireland needed to face the new social needs and demands that were becoming a 
strong political voice (Gallagher, 2012). In addition, the statistics on single parenthood show that 
it has become a significant feature of the Irish demographic scene; for instance, there was an 
increase of 135% of single parents between 1986 and 1996, and the needs for childcare support 
for working mothers became one of the urgent social issues (Murphy-Lawless, 2000).  
As one of the Liberal welfare state countries, the care sector in Ireland has been heavily 
influenced by processes of neo-liberalization.
31
 While the force of neo-liberalization of childcare 
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 As mentioned before, Ireland is a country characterized with dual welfare features. Due to the lack of the state 
intervention and strong church-family involvement in childcare services, some scholars found Ireland unfit in the 
Liberal welfare regime (e.g., Bonoli, 2000; Cochrane & Clarke, 1993). In this study, however, I follow Esping-
Andersen’s welfare typology, which categorizes Ireland in the Liberal model. 
31
 Gallagher (2012) explained the process of neo-liberalization in Ireland as follows: (1) introducing techniques of 
performance, adopted from private sector activity, into the organization and management of public sector services; 
(2) re-articulating responsibility of care provision from the public sector onto the private and voluntary sector, 
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services has impacted all modern societies, especially ones with the Liberal welfare state, the 
irony is that the government involvement has greatly increased in those processes (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002). Indeed, except for the US, as seen in Table 1-3, social expenditures spent on 
families both in the UK—3.8% of GDP—and Ireland—4.1% of GDP—are the highest among 
the 19 OECD countries. However, with the shift in childcare policy from informal to formal 
services under the two forces of the state and market, it is, indeed, impossible not to encounter 
financial challenges and budgetary pressures in this time of economic downturn and instability. 
 
Switzerland 
Switzerland, regarded as the only Liberal welfare state country in the middle of the 
European Continent, had its first maternity leave under federal law in 1877, which prohibited 
expecting mothers from working for eight weeks; it was job-protected, though unpaid (OECD, 
2012b). In 1911, the first paid maternity leave was introduced with a flat rate payment for six 
weeks (Gauthier, 2011b). In 2005, 14 weeks of maternity leave were introduced with an 80% of 
payment benefit and remains the same as of 2010 (Gauthier, 2011a; 2011b; OECD, 2012b). No 
parental or childcare leave is available on the federal level in Switzerland. 
In fact, Switzerland is similar to the US in that there is no such thing as a federal family 
policy in the country, as any decisions made in families are considered a private matter; while 
the federal constitution allows for federal regulation of both child benefits and maternity or 
sickness protection, employers are responsible for paying for those benefits, and the benefits are 
income-tested (OECD, 2004). In a country with a strong male breadwinner orientation, which 
granted women’s voting rights in 1971 and traditionally considered women as mothers confined 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
through which the task of sourcing care is accorded to the individual and community; and (3) care being provided 
based on the capacity of the individual consumer to purchase it in a shift to a  Do It Yourself (DIY) welfare state. 
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within their family roles only, the Swiss mothers used to be more likely to stay home, rather than 
be employed in the labor market. This was not because of their choices, but, rather, it was due to 
the lack of childcare support; indeed, in the mid-1990s, more than 50% of mothers not in the 
workforce expressed that they would have preferred to work if their children could be placed in 
day care (Daguerre, 2006). In addition to the lack of quality public care facilities, the center-
based care is most expensive for working families in Switzerland, especially in Zurich, along 
with other Liberal welfare state countries; the out-of-pocket expenses for families with two 
children can go up to between 20% to 40% of the entire family budget, and the cost of childcare 
has been one of the major barriers for women to work (Immervoll & David, 2006). 
Since the late 1990s, four major factors, among others, have contributed to leading to the 
inscription of childcare on the policy agenda in Switzerland: (1) an alliance between feminist 
movements and business interests was formed and became a powerful political power; (2) female 
education attainment and their labor force participation rates continued to dramatically increase; 
(3) it was a time of labor shortage, and the country was in need of highly educated and skilled 
workers in the labor market; and (4) the Social Democratic Party that traditionally empathized 
more with women took power in the early 2000s. Indeed, though still lagging, Switzerland has 
been slowly responding to the urgent needs and demands of childcare support; as a result, over 
the last decade, the proportion of families using the care services more than doubled (Daguerre, 
2006). 
Currently, Switzerland has the highest female employment rate along with Norway in 19 
OECD countries—73%, as seen in Table 1-3. However, due to the continuous lack of family 
policy and childcare supports along with the deeply rooted and widely accepted culture of gender 
inequity in family and the workforce, women still do not seem to be able to balance their family 
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and work responsibilities. For instance, in Switzerland, the fertility rate is inversely associated 
with its high female employment rate; while the country has a great number of women 
participating in the labor market, its fertility rate is 1.5, lower than the 19 OECD average of 1.68. 
This does seem to be a prevalent trend in many OECD countries, especially in places where 
public supports for working women and mothers are lacking. However, the issue is particularly 
relevant to Switzerland; the proportion of women who have tertiary education attainment and are 
childless is as high as 40%, and many families have expressed that they are smaller in size than 
desired (OECD, 2004). 
 
Countries in East Asian Regime 
While at least two countries represent all other welfare regimes in previous studies, East 
Asia has not received much attention until recent years. When it did, Japan was the only country 
considered in related discussions. This is mainly because of the lack of data available or 
accessible.
32
 For this research, I added Korea as another representative country in the region, 
along with Japan. As standing and growing figures of the world economy, it is worthwhile to 
include and discuss the two countries and the East Asian regime from a cross-national 
perspective. 
Japan 
Japan currently provides 14 weeks of maternity leave at 67% of earnings and 44 weeks of 
parental leave at a 40% payment rate (Gauthier, 2001a). With regard to public investment in 
families, Japan greatly falls below its Western counterparts, as seen in Table 1-3. The country 
spends only about 1% of its GDP for the social expenditures on families. This indicates a 
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 Japan and Korea are the only OECD members in East Asia, and the ILO membership extends to Japan, Korea, 
and Singapore only. 
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significant contrast to other highly developed OECD countries, which provide 2.3% of GDP on 
average. The figure in Japan represents one of the lowest numbers among all countries, along 
with Korea and the US. However, with the increasing needs and demands for public support of 
working families and the extremely low fertility rate, Japan has been making tremendous efforts 
in reforming its family policy and meeting the international standards and norms of family policy, 
especially in recent decades. While Japan currently marks a relatively high female employment 
rate (60%), its fertility rate is among the lowest in the world (1.39), as seen in Table 1-2; 
naturally, family policy debates in Japan, like most East Asian countries (where fertility rates are 
collectively extremely low and among the lowest in the world), have been largely fuelled by 
concerns about the persistently and extremely low fertility rate (Adema, 2012). 
It was in 1922 during the Taisho period
33
 when Japan first introduced its maternity 
leave—10 weeks at 60% of earnings (Gauthier, 2011b). In 1947, after the Second World War 
under the Social Democratic Party, the Labour Standard Law made the five-week post-natal 
leave mandatory and prohibited the dismissal of women during maternity leave and for 30 days 
following the end of leave; however, not everyone was covered (Waldfogel et al., 1998). The 
reform continued under the Liberal Democratic Party,
34
 the center-right conservative party; in 
1958, the leave became extended to 12 weeks with the same payment rate (Gauthier, 2011b). The 
leave was again extended to 14 weeks in 1986 (OECD, 2012b). 
It was in 1990 when the total fertility rate in 1989—1.57—was released by the 
government, which was lower than the lowest figure in the history of Japan—1.58—in 1966; the 
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 Between the Meiji Era (1867-1912) and Showa (1926-1989), the Taisho Period (1912-1989) is considered the 
time of the liberal movement, also known as the “Taisho Democracy” in Japan. 
34
 The Liberal Democratic Party—LDP—is the major political force in Japanese politics. The party took power from 
1955 to 1993 and again from 1996 to 2009. After the brief interruption of the Democratic Party of Japan—DPJ—
the center-left party from 2009 to 2012, with the Prime Minister Abe, LDP returned to power again in 2012 and 
played a major power role and influenced the nation’s social policy agenda. 
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popularity of the term “1.57 shock” became reflected in the fact that it was introduced to the 
Encyclopedia of Families published in 1996 and led to the establishment of a specially 
coordinated committee dealing with low fertility issues, namely the Committee for Creating a 
Good Environment for Having and Bringing-up Children, in the Office of Cabinet’s Council on 
Internal Affairs (Atoh & Akachi, 2003). The efforts were aimed in reforming family policy in 
order to improve the nation’s social environment for families, especially for mothers, to be able 
to pursue what they want or need and be able to have children; however, the fertility rate in 
Japan continued to decline, marking the lowest in 2005 at 1.26. Even with various policy reforms, 
Japan is still considered a society or culture that tends to fear and oppose changes in traditional 
family and gender structures and practices both in family and the workforce (Peng, 2008). 
In 1992, in addition to the current paid maternity leave, the Child Care Leave Law was 
introduced to entitle parents to unpaid leave until the child is one year of age, though the law was 
applied only for firms with 30 and more employees; moreover, while both parents were entitled 
to this leave, it could not be split between the parents (Waldfogel et al., 1998). In 1994, the 
“Angel Plan” was first introduced with an ambitious aim to improve childcare services 
nationwide, which included, for instance, the increase of the provision of public nursery schools 
and services with extended hours of childcare, temporary or part-time childcare, and community 
childcare support as well as the introduction of after-school care services for elementary school 
children (Atoh & Akachi, 2003). In 1995, family leave policy became applied to firms of all 
sizes and included payment benefits at 25% of earnings; it was equivalent to 25% of previous 
earnings, of which 20% was paid during leave and 5% was paid after six months of post-leave 
for insured employees (Huguchi, 1997). 
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The “New Angel Plan” was introduced in 1999 as an extension of the previous plan for 
another five years; in 2001, the duration of parental leave increased to three years for 
government officials, and the payment rate for childcare increased from 25% to 40% (Peng, 
2002). In 2007, the payment benefit of maternity leave increased to 67%. Finally, in 2010, 
parental leave became an individual entitlement under the Child Care and Family Care Law, 
allowing a parent to take leave even when his or her partner was on leave or not in the labor 
market; moreover, leave was extended until the child becomes 134 months of age if both parents 
take some leave (i.e., a bonus for sharing leave) with a possibility of extending further when 
more children are present (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012b). 
 
Korea 
In Korea, after the liberation from the Japanese rule at the end of the Second World War 
in 1945, 60 days of unpaid maternity leave were first introduced in 1953 under the National 
Labor Standard Law (Kim, 2011; Kim, 2013). The fully paid maternity leave began in the 1990s 
and is still implemented today (ILO, 2010). Korea’s national priority has been economic 
development, especially under the Park Chung Hee regime (1964–1979), established by way of 
military coup in 1961, and the country, indeed, has achieved rapid growth over a short period of 
time. The Korean case is a clear example of how a developmental state (Johnson, 1999) emerges 
in the process of the government forming strong alliances with and/or control over large 
conglomerates called “chaebols.35” While under the capitalistic framework, the state 
implemented strong protectionist measures to preserve and develop the domestic market first; 
moreover, the state had control over the banking system and international trade licenses (Castells, 
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 The four leading Korean chaebols are Samsung, Lucky Goldstar (LG), Daewoon, and Hyundai, and they are now 
among the world’s largest corporations. 
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1998; Sung, 2003). Thus, the economic boom during this time was effectively used to legitimize 
the Park authoritarian state. Therefore, there had been no effective social policy linked to labor 
relations, even though the changing needs and demands of working parents had been steadily 
growing since the 1960s. Likewise, the dictatorship regime under Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 that 
followed the Park administration limited family and labor policy to enforce various restrictions, 
such as workers’ wages (Sung, 2003). However, throughout the 1980s, the political atmosphere 
in Korea began to change dramatically as citizens, including college students and workers, 
mobilized nationwide pro-democracy movements. Furthermore, the economy continued to grow 
with the rise of the middle class, and in 1988, Korea held the World Olympics in its capital city, 
Seoul. Indeed, the international community witnessed the country’s remarkable economic and 
social achievements through the event. 
In 1997, the country faced the Asian Financial Crisis, and the urgent needs and demands 
for more egalitarian social policy and supportive welfare system peaked. In the following year, 
with the victory of the Democratic (“Minju”) Party, the country’s representative left-wing liberal 
party, the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003) came to power, and a number of policy 
reforms began to take place immediately. In 2001, maternity leave became extended to 90 days 
with the full payment benefit (Kim, 2011; Kim, 2013). Parental leave, which was first introduced 
as unpaid leave in 1987 under the Gender Employment Equity Law, was extended from no 
payment to a flat rate of 200,000 (Korean won) per month in 1995, and it again increased to 
300,000 won in 2002; moreover, under the Roh Moo Hyun government from the same party 
(2003-2008), the payment continued to increase to 400,000 won in 2004, and then it again 
increased to 500,000 won in 2007
36
 (OECD, 2012b). In 2008, the three days of full paid paternity 
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500,000 won in 2007, for instance, is about a 26.3% payment rate (Kim, 2011; Kim, 2013). 
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leave were introduced, which became extended to five days in 2012, though this policy only 
applied to firms with more than 300 employees. As of 2010, Korea provides 13 weeks of fully 
paid maternity leave and 44 weeks of parental leave. 
While the duration of leave and payment rates have been increasing consistently, Korea 
still lags behind other OECD countries; even when comparing social expenditures on families in 
Table 1-3, Korea’s figure marks a strikingly low level of 0.8% of its GDP, much lower than the 
19 OECD average of 2.3%. The expenditures spent on family cash allowances and the 
expenditures on maternity and parental leave are particularly low compared with other 
countries—0.01% and 0.03%, respectively. Furthermore, the overall costs for care and education 
for children under 5 years old, for which each family is responsible, are notorious in Korea and 
have been one of the most important social issues for a long time. While some government 
supports are available for parents who need help, each family still must bear the burden of 
paying for up to over 80% of costs and services for children under 5 years old, which is highly 
unaffordable, especially for the poor (Seo et al., 2005). In addition, an increasing disparity in 
income levels and across regions is another urgent issue to be addressed within the Korean 
society. Specific gender roles within the family and the workforce are still deeply rooted, and 
such social norms are widely accepted and practiced in the Korean culture. In this aspect, the 
system is very similar to that of the South European welfare model (e.g., Italy and Greece); 
indeed, Korea is a country with the lowest fertility rate of 1.22, as of 2010, as well as a low 
female employment rate of 53%, similar to Italy and Greece, which is demonstrated in Table 1-2.  
In sum, countries vary greatly in their provisions of family leave policy depending on 
their unique needs and urgent issues to address. Furthermore, while variations exist among 
countries within each welfare model, the regime type seems to be associated with the overall 
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family policy objectives and agenda. Overall, the leave policy is more generous in the Social 
Democratic and Conservative regimes, both in duration and payment benefits, compared with 






Chapter Three: Data and Method 
Data and Measures 
In this paper, I focus on 19 OECD countries from 1969 to 2010.
37
 Table 1-5 provides the 
descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in my study. The data were all retrieved from 
publicly available sources, such as the OECD (Stat Extracts), WHO (European Health for All 
Database), ILO (Maternity at Work), and World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
Additionally, I relied on the United States Social Security Administration (SSA) and 
International Social Security Association (ISSA). For Korea and Japan, I also used data from the 
National Office of Statistics and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, respectively.
38
 For the United States, I additionally used data from the 
National Vital Statistics Reports from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Data for my independent variables—family leave policy in weeks—were obtained from 
the dataset developed by Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005). To extend the dataset, in addition to 
the sources I mentioned above, I used PF 2.5. Annex: Detail of Change in Parental Leave by 
Country (OECD, 2012b) as well as the latest version (3) of the Comparative Family Policy 
dataset from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (MPIDR),
39
 which was 
organized by Gauthier (2011a). Table 1-6 provides an overview of family leave policy in the 19 
OECD countries in 2010. Following the way in which family leave policy was organized in 
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 The 19 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea (South Korea or “Korea”), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
38
 www.index.go.kr (Korea); and http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm (Japan) 
39
 One of the most recent OECD reports using the Dataset Version 2 was “Labour Market Effects of Parental Leave 
Policies in OECD Countries” by Olivier Thevenon and Anne Solaz (2013). The dataset has been updated, and I am 
using the most recent version (3) for this research. Original sources include the OECD, International Labor 
Organization, United States Social Security Administration, World Health Organization, Council of Europe, and 
Missoc, among others. 
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Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005), in this section, family leave policy is discussed in three 
measures as follows: 
Independent Variables: 
1) Job-protected paid leave: Weeks of job protected paid leave 
2) Other leave: Weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected paid leave 
3) Total leave: Sum of all leave 
 
Job-protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental 
leave, which includes family and adoptive leave, but not paternity leave.
40
 In addition, I control 
separately for weeks of other leave as my second independent variable. Other leave refers to 
weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected paid leave, which includes parental leave provided 
at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected (e.g., Austria and Germany). In addition, I 
add childcare leave that is also either unpaid or paid at a very low flat rate and not clearly job-
protected. In the effort to follow previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005), I adhere the 
following rules: (1) When there is no distinction between maternity leave and parental or 
childcare leave with the same job protection and payment, the leave is under “job-protected paid 
leave,” which was usually the case for the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, including Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden; (2) Parental leave and childcare leave in the dataset are usually 
the additional leave entitlements taken after maternity leave; therefore, in this case, total leave 
can be obtained simply by adding all weeks of leave. However, in some countries, parental or 
childcare leave is given until the child reaches a certain age, in which case maternity leave is 
already included in parental or childcare leave, as Gauthier (2011a) noted; thus, in this case, I 
deduct post-birth maternity leave from parental or childcare leave in order to avoid 
overestimation and correlation. For instance: (i) in Finland, childcare leave lasts until the child’s 
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 Fathers’ take-up rates are known to be still very low in most OECD countries, and as illustrated above, daddy’s 
quota (“take it or lose it”) has been enacted in a few countries of the Social Democratic regime. 
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third birthday; (ii) in France, Germany, and Spain, parental leave lasts until the child’s third 
birthday; and (iii) in Sweden, childcare leave lasts until the 18
 
months of age; and (3) when no 
differentiation between pre-birth and post-birth maternity leave is noted, I assume them to be 
equal except for: (i) Japan (from 2000 and 2010), where 14 total weeks of maternity leave are 
assumed to be six pre-birth and eight post-birth as previous years; (ii) the UK (from 1998 to 
2003), where 18 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be 11 pre-birth and seven post-
birth, as in previous years; and (iii) Portugal (from 1996 to 1998), where 14 total weeks of 
maternity leave are assumed to be 5.4 pre-birth and 8.6 post-birth, as in previous years. 
Table 1-7 presents financial sources for maternity protection provided on a national level. 
The 19 OECD countries typically adopt two main approaches toward financing cash benefits for 
maternity: (1) social security; or (2) mixed systems. Many countries rely on their social security 
systems that cover health or unemployment insurance in addition to relying on other types of 
public funds that come from various levels of government; these systems use contributions from 
some combination of employees, employers, and government revenues to create an insurance 
pool that is then used to finance benefits (ILO, 2010). Other countries (e.g., Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Korea, Switzerland, and the UK) use mixed systems, in which employers and social 
security systems usually share a responsibility for benefits, while the percentage that employers 
must contribute to cash benefits varies across countries. Table 1-8 provides the change/increase 
in weeks of leave over the last four decades across the 19 OECD countries. 
For my outcome variables, I use five age-specific pediatric mortality rates, low birth 
weight, and immunization rates for measles and DPT. All outcome variables are continuous and 
in the natural log because they are positively skewed (non-zero): 
(1) Infant mortality rate (infant deaths under 1 year per 1,000 live births); 
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(2) Perinatal mortality rate (deaths within 1 week of life per 1,000 live births and 
stillbirths); 
(3) Neonatal mortality rate (deaths under 28 days of age per 1,000 live births); 
(4) Post-neonatal mortality rate (deaths between 28 days and 1 year of age per 1,000 live 
births); and 




(6) Low birth weight (number of live births <2,500 grams as % of the total number of live 
births); 
(7) Percent of immunization for DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) for children under 
1 year of age; and 
(8) Percent of immunization for measles for children under 1 year of age. 
 
I include all five mortality measures, covering ages from 0 to 5 years, because prior 
research has found that the effects of leave policy vary with the child’s age. I note again that the 
largest effects of leave policy are expected to be found in reducing deaths that occur within a 
year after birth—i.e., infant and post-neonatal mortality rates, as leading causes of infant and 
post-neonatal deaths are greatly influenced by the parents’ activities and their involvement in 
infant care during the first critical year of a newborn’s life (e.g., Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 
accidents, pneumonia and influenza, and homicide); such activities and involvement in infant 
care are expected to be affected by and/or particularly sensitive to family leave policy (Ruhm, 
2000). On the other hand, I expect for the effects of leave to be very small or possibly none on 
deaths within the first week (prenatal) or month (neonatal); the hypothesis is based on the fact 
that these early mortality rates are more likely to be influenced by pre- and at-birth health 
condition of parents, which will not change dramatically by a short pre-birth leave of five to six 
weeks, on average, in OECD countries. I include child mortality in my study, as several 
countries, like Norway and Sweden, provide leave beyond one year. 
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In addition, I estimate the effects of family leave policy on my secondary outcome 
variables: low birth weight and immunization rates for measles and DPT. I include them as my 
outcome variables because low birth weight, similar to perinatal and neonatal deaths, may be 
affected by leave policy, specifically pre-birth leave, which may contribute to the mother’s pre-
birth health conditions that are closely related to the occurrence of low birth weight. However, as 
noted before, it is possible that the effects of leave may be very small or possibly none; low birth 
weight is most influenced by the pre-birth condition of parents, which may not improve 
dramatically by the limited weeks of pre-birth leave. Moreover, immunization rates may be 
expected to be influenced by leave policy, as parents on leave would be given more time to take 
their infants to get the necessary immunizations during the first critical year after birth; however, 
the effects are also expected to be very small or possibly none, given that the rates have already 
been very high without much variation in all 19 OECD countries, and immunization for measles 
is introduced after the child’s first birthday in many countries (Tanaka, 2005).  
These secondary outcome variables—including low birth weight as well as immunization 
rates for measles and DPT—may also be mediators that influence the relationship between leave 
policy and mortality rates. Low birth weight is one of the most influential risk factors for 
pediatric mortality rates, whereas immunizations for measles and DPT can be important 
protective factors for a newborn (McCormick, 1985; Strully et al., 2010); they may predict other 
child health outcomes, including mortality rates and, thus, they are used both as outcome 
variables and control variables.
41
 
                                                          
41
While Ruhm (2000) found no significant effects of leave policy on low birth weight, Tanaka (2005) detected that 
paid leave significantly decreased low birth weight, suggesting that pre-birth leave had positive effects on mortality 
rates by decreasing the occurrence of low birth weight (not immunization rates). 
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Furthermore, I analyze the effects of leave on outcome measures with additional control 
variables (I also test without them): (1) real GDP per capita in thousands of purchasing power 
parity (PPP)-adjusted in the 2005 US dollars; (2) the total expenditures on health care as a 
percentage of GDP; (3) the share of the population covered by health insurance
42
 (public and 
primary private coverage); (4) the number of kidney dialysis patients per 100,000 population; (5) 
the fertility rate of 15–44 year old women (total fertility rates43); and (6) the female employment-
to-population ratios. GDP per capita is a universally used economic indicator for a country’s 
wealth; therefore, it is likely to positively influence child health, as indicated above. In the same 
light, the total health expenditures and health insurance coverage are also important variables to 
control for because they are specifically allocated for healthcare and, thus, they are highly related 
to child health measures.
44
 The number of dialysis patients is included, as done previously, since 
it can be a proxy for medical infrastructure/technology (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005). Fertility 
rates are taken into consideration because they are likely positively related to the number of 
deaths among newborns. Moreover, female employment rates are included because they can 
positively impact child health with a higher income, but at the same time, they can prevent 
mothers from spending more time with their children.
45
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 In all countries, more than 99% of the population is covered by public health insurance, except Germany (89.2% 
public and 10.8% primary private) and the United States (26.4% public and 54.9% primary private). 
43
I use total fertility rate (TFR), which is a more direct measure of the level of fertility than the crude birth rate, as it 
refers to births per woman and shows the potential for population change in the country. TFR in a specific year is 
the average number of children who would be born to a synthetic cohort of women whose age-specific birth rates 
were the same as those actually observed in the year in question (Hotz, Klerman, & Willis, 1997). Moreover, TFR 
reflects the interplay of two components, namely quantum tempo effects: the level (number of children) and timing 
(time of birth) of fertility. Therefore, it is affected by changes in the timing of childbearing; for instance, in years in 
which timing of childbearing is advanced, the TFR is inflated, compared to the level that would have been observed 
without such timing changes, and vice versa (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). In addressing this issue, many scholars 
have studied how this measure could and should be better used and adjusted. (For more details, see Bongaarts & 
Feeney, 1998; Kim & Schoen, 2000; Kohler & Ortega, 2002; and Sobotka et al., 2005.) 
44
 While more potential control variables, such as health expenditures on pregnant women or infant or prenatal care, 
would be informative, sufficient data for the 19 OECD countries over the last four decades were not available. 
45
 I note that fertility rate and female employment may be endogenous because family policy, including leave 
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I also control for three types of public social welfare expenditures on families and 
children (I also test without them): (1) the public expenditures on family cash allowances; (2) the 
public expenditures on maternity and parental leave
46
; and (3) the public expenditures on family 
services. Because my analysis focuses on the effects of leave on child health indicators, it is 
appropriate to control for expenditures spent on families and children as well as to test whether 
they change the way in which leave policy influences my outcome variables. All of my 
expenditure variables have been PPP-adjusted in the US dollars and defined by expenditures per 
child. The public expenditures on family cash allowances and the expenditures on family 
services are divided by the number of children ages 0-14; further, the public expenditures on 
maternity and parental leave are divided by the number of children ages 0-4. The same method 
was applied in previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005). 
 
Method of Analysis 
I estimate the effects of leave policy—job-protected paid leave and other leave (unpaid or 
non-job protected)—on eight child health outcomes (all continuous) in 19 OECD countries from 
1969 to 2010 using OLS models, including country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-
time trend interactions to control for unobserved factors across countries and time periods. 
(1) Country fixed effects are incorporated in order to control for the specific fixed effects of 
each country over a time period—i.e., is the outcome in question different for each 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
schemes, usually aims to promote fertility rate as well as female employment in most OECD countries (for more 
details, see literature review in Gauthier, 2007; and Thevenon, 2011). Nonetheless, I include both variables 
following Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005), since family leave policy is related to both female employment and 
fertility rates, and they separately play an important role as control variables. The two variables are quite different 
because fertility rate is for overall female population, especially fertile age groups, and female employment rate 
varies by time and by country’s overall economy and policy on the labor market. 
46
As was previously indicated, it is expected that by controlling for the expenditures on maternity and parental leave, 
the magnitude of the effects of leave would be diminished and statistical precision would be eliminated; however, I 
observe how the results might come out differently with more countries and years, and I concurrently control for 
other expenditures to compensate for the issue. 
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country over a specific time period? These country dummies are defined by dichotomous 
variables. 
 
(2) Year fixed effects in order to control for the specific fixed effects of each year for all 
countries. This set of year dummies is also defined by dichotomous variables for all 
years from 1969 to 2010. 
 
(3) Country-time (linear) trend interactions, which I create using the country dummies and a 
time trend (linear) variable.
47
 The interactions are incorporated to control for country-
specific time varying effects—i.e., whether the effects of the country on the outcome 
depend on time, as well as whether the change of outcome with time depends on the 
particular country. 
 
As expected, I have a number of missing values in my dataset; the results from the 
missing data analysis are presented in Table 1-10. Instead of applying the method used by 
previous researchers,
48
 I conduct multiple imputations. First, I conduct the Little’s Test49 to test 
whether missing data are missing completely at random (MCAR), which can be ignorable 
because the “missing-ness” does not depend on the observed data. However, I had to reject the 
null hypothesis, as the Little’s Test results came out highly significant (p=0.000). Therefore, I 
assume that my missing data are missing at random (MAR) instead of missing completely at 
random (MCAR), which suggests that it is appropriate to replace the missing data by conducting 
multiple imputations. All variables with missing numbers are imputed, except the ones whose 
values are missing more than 10%, as they are missing in a systematic pattern as underlined in 
Tables 1-10 and 1-11. The following variables have values that are missing for most countries 
prior to 1980: low birth weight, immunization rates for measles and DPT, and social 
                                                          
47
 The country-specific time trend dummy variables are assumed to be linear in both Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka 
(2005). I tested for both linear and cubic models, whether they contribute to the effects of policy on outcome 
variables (as an example, see Appendix 4 for results with cubic time trends); no change in policy effects was found 
with cubic models in all analyses, and, therefore, I use linear trends. 
48
 Previous research (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005) mainly used the following three methods for missing data: (1) 
assumed to be same as a previous year (e.g., fertility rate for the US in 1969 and 1970); (2) filled with numbers 
using the average of the immediate year before and after (e.g., female employment rate for Denmark in 1980); and 
(3) assumed to have increased/grown at a constant rate (e.g., female employment rate for Greece from 1972 to 
1976). 
49
 Ha: Data are not missing completely at random; Ho: Data are missing completely at random. 
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expenditures on families (family cash allowances, maternity and parental leave, and family-
related services). Some data on dialysis patients are missing for Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Korea, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland prior to 1980. 
For multiple imputations, I use the predictive mean matching (PMM) method to 
incorporate the appropriate restrictions for the variables I impute
50
; for instance, values should 
not exceed 100 for variables in a percent measure, such as health expenditures and health 
insurance coverage. Female employment ranges from 0 to 1. I also do not expect to have any 
negative values in my variables. After running multiple imputations 20 times, all of the imputed 
values are within my restrictions. The summary of the non-imputed original data and imputed 
data is presented in Table 1-11. I note that, as a robustness check, I repeat all analyses with both 
non-imputed and imputed data and confirm that the results are similar. 
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The predictive mean matching (PMM) method is a tool that calculates the predicted values of target variables 
according to the specified imputation model and proves to be robust against model misspecification; imputations 
are based on values observed elsewhere, so they are realistic, and imputations outside of the observed data range 




Chapter Four: The Effects of Family Leave Policy on Child Health 
Results I: The effects of leave policy in 19 OECD countries from 1969 to 2010 
Five Mortality Rate Outcomes 
Table 2-1 shows the results from three models estimating the effects of both job-
protected paid leave and other leave (unpaid or non-job protected leave) on infant mortality (the 
natural log of infant mortality). Model 1 includes the effects of weeks of job-protected paid leave 
only. Model 2 takes into consideration four country characteristic variables that are related to the 
governments’ direct investments in their citizens and the economic capacity for social safety net: 
GDP per capita, the total expenditures on healthcare as a percentage of GDP, the share of 
population with health insurance coverage, and the number of patients under kidney dialysis. 
Model 3 adds two more crucial control variables that are associated with family and labor market 
dynamics: fertility rates and female employment-to-population ratios. Finally, Model 4 takes into 
consideration other leave (unpaid or non-job protected leave). Other leave is a crucial indicator 
that needs to be added due to the fact that most of the 19 OECD countries have extended both 
job-protected paid leave and other leave over the last four decades. All four models include 
country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-time trend interactions. The results overall 
indicate that job protected paid leave has significant effects in reducing infant mortality. In 
Model 1, without any control variable, a 10-week extension of job protected paid leave reduces 
infant mortality by 2.05% (p=0.001); a 2.05% decrease in infant mortality means a reduction in 
the infant death rate from 10 to 9.795 per 1,000 live births.  
In Model 2, with four country characteristic variables, the results indicate that a 10-week 
extension of job-protected paid leave reduces infant mortality by 1.92%, and the effects are still 
highly significant (p=0.002). In Model 3, when adding two more control variables that are 
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related to family and work dynamics (fertility rates and female employment-to-population ratios), 
the results are consistent; a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave reduces infant 
mortality by 2.00%, and the effects are highly significant (p=0.002). Finally, Model 4, when 
controlling for all six control variables and other leave, shows that the results are quite consistent, 
which suggests that the effects are robust throughout all model specifications; a 10-week 
extension of job-protected paid leave significantly reduces infant mortality by 2.06% (p=0.001). 
No effects of other leave are found. Overall, the results from Table 2-1 are consistent with 





On the other hand, Tables 2-2 and 2-3 show that throughout all models (with the model 
specifications the same as above), both job-protected paid leave and other leave have no 
significant effects in reducing perinatal and neonatal mortality rates. While I had expected small 
(albeit some positive) effects of leave policy in reducing all mortality rates, as found in Tanaka 
(2005), my findings are more consistent with Ruhm (2000), which reported no evidence of the 
effects of leave in reducing perinatal mortality and little effects in reducing neonatal mortality.  
Table 2-4 shows the results that indicate the effects of family leave policy on post-
neonatal mortality. Models from 1 to 4 have the same model specifications as above, and all 
include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-time trend interaction variables. 
Model 1, without any control variables, indicates that a 10-week extension of job-protected paid 
leave significantly decreases post-neonatal mortality by 5.17% (p=0.000). Model 2, with four 
country characteristic variables, shows that the leave extension significantly decreases post-
neonatal mortality by 6.36% (p=0.000). Model 3, with two additional control variables of 
                                                          
51
Only results on infant mortality with this model specification—i.e., without control variables—were discussed in 
previously studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005); they both reported that job-protected paid leave significantly 
reduced infant mortality. 
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fertility and female employment rates, also shows that the leave extension significantly reduces 
post-neonatal mortality by 6.21% (p=0.000). Finally, Model 4, with all control variables and 
other leave, indicates that a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave significantly reduces 
the post-neonatal mortality rate by 6.16% (p=0.000).
 52
 Throughout all model specifications, 
other leave has no effects in reducing post-neonatal mortality. Therefore, as expected, the results 
overall indicate that job-protected paid leave has larger and more significant effects in reducing 
post-neonatal mortality than it does on other mortality rates; these findings are consistent with 
previous research (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005). 
Table 2-5 shows results that indicate no effects of job-protected paid leave or other leave 
in reducing child mortality. The model specifications are the same as above. My results are 
somewhat different from previous findings, where job-protected paid leave did have significant 




Low Birth Weight and Immunizations as Outcomes 
Tables 2-6 to 2-8 show the results with the same model specifications as above, 
estimating the effects of leave policy on my secondary outcome indicators: low birth weight and 
immunization rates for measles and DPT. Again, all models include country fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and country-time trend interaction variables. I use data for the 19 OECD countries 
from 1980 to 2010 (instead of 1969 to 2010) because a great portion of data on low birth weight 
                                                          
52Tanaka’s (2005) results indicate that job-protected paid leave decreases the post-neonatal mortality rate by 4.06% 
when using Model 4 (18 countries from 1969 to 2000). When I used my dataset for the same years and countries, the 
results came out to be 7.96% (p=0.000). The amplified policy effects may be explained by the improved policy 
measure by incorporating a new data source from the Max Planck Institute (Gauthier, 2011a) and different 
imputation method for missing values. 
53
For instance, Tanaka (2005), using data on the 18 OECD countries from 1969 to 2000, indicated that a 10-week 
extension of job-protected paid leave significantly decreased the post-neonatal mortality rate by 4.06%, whereas 
regarding child mortality, the effects were 3.16%.  
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and immunization rates for most countries are missing prior to that time period. The results show 
no significant effects—neither for job-protected paid leave or other leave—on any of the 
secondary outcome variables. 
Low Birth Weight and Immunizations as Mediators 
As job-protected paid leave has the largest effects in reducing post-neonatal mortality 
than it does on other mortality rates, I estimate some additional models for post-neonatal 
mortality with more control variables. Table 2-9 indicates the results from models that estimate 
the effects of both job-protected paid leave and other leave on post-neonatal mortality, 
additionally controlling for my secondary outcome variables as mediators—low birth weight 
(which is considered a risk factor for mortality) and immunization rates for measles and DPT 
(which are considered protective factors for mortality). In all models, I continue to use all six 
major control variables and country and year fixed effects as well as country-time trend 
interactions. Because leave policy does not significantly affect mediating factors as seen from 
Tables 2-6 to 2-8, it is unlikely that controlling for them would explain the effects of policy on 
post-neonatal mortality; however, the results still provide some interesting findings. I first note 
that throughout all model specifications, other leave has no significant effects on any of the 
outcome variables.  
In Model A, controlling for low birth weight, the results indicate that the effects of job-
protected paid leave on post-neonatal mortality remain robust though slightly reduced; a 10-week 
leave extension reduces post-neonatal mortality by 3.67% (p=0.014). The results also indicate 
that low birth weight has significant effects on post-neonatal mortality; a 1.00% increase in low 
birth weight significantly increases post-neonatal mortality by 5.13% (p=0.000). Model B shows 
the results estimating the effects of leave policy on post-neonatal mortality, controlling for 
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immunization rate for measles. The results indicate that the effects of leave policy in reducing 
post-neonatal mortality rate remain significant; a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave 
predicts a reduction in post-neonatal mortality by 3.77% (p=0.014). The results indicate that the 
immunization rate for measles does not have significant effects on the mortality rate. In Model C, 
when controlling for immunization rate for DPT, the results indicate that a 10-week extension of 
job-protected paid leave policy still significantly reduces post-neonatal mortality by 4.16% 
(p=0.007). Moreover, the results indicate that a 1.00% increase in the immunization rate for DPT 
significantly reduces the post-neonatal mortality rate by 0.73% (p=0.031).  
Model D shows the results that indicate that when controlling for all three mediators 
concurrently—low birth weight and immunizations for measles and DPT—the effects of job-
protected paid leave are still significant in reducing post-neonatal mortality rate by 4.01% 
(p=0.007). The effects of low birth weight and immunization for DPT are significant in 
increasing post-neonatal mortality by 5.11% (p=0.000) and reducing the mortality rate by 0.70% 
(p=0.036), respectively.  
Including Social Expenditures on Families 
Table 2-10 shows the results from models that estimate the effects of both job-protected 
paid leave and other leave on post-neonatal mortality controlling for three types of social welfare 
expenditures on families: (1) the expenditures on family cash allowances; (2) the expenditures on 
maternity and parental leave; and (3) the expenditures on family services. Because the data on 
social expenditures are missing for most countries prior to 1980, I observe the data available in 
the years from 1980 to 2010. For all models, I continue to include all six control variables and 
country and year fixed effects as well as country-time trend interactions. The overall results 
throughout all of the models show that even when controlling for social expenditures, both 
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individually and concurrently, job-protected paid leave significantly reduces post-neonatal 
mortality, whereas other leave has no significant effects in all cases. 
In Model A, without controlling for any welfare expenditure, a 10-week extension of job-
protected paid leave significantly decreases post-neonatal mortality by 4.99% (p=0.002) from 
1980 to 2010. In Model B, with controlling for the expenditures on cash allowances, the results 
indicate that a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave significantly decreases post-
neonatal mortality by 5.10% (p=0.001), suggesting that the effects are robust. In Model C, when 
controlling for the expenditures on maternity and parental leave, job-protected paid leave still 
significantly reduces post-neonatal mortality by 5.02% (p=0.002). In Model D, when controlling 
for the expenditures on family services, a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave again 
significantly reduces post-neonatal mortality by 4.83% (p=0.002). Therefore, the results are 
robust throughout all of the model specifications, controlling for social expenditure variables 
individually. 
Regarding Models E to H, the results overall indicate that even when controlling for the 
welfare expenditures concurrently, job-protected paid leave still significantly reduces post-
neonatal mortality rate. It is shown that in Model E, when controlling for the expenditures on 
cash allowances and the expenditures on maternity and parental leave, a 10-week extension of 
job-protected paid leave significantly decreases post-neonatal mortality by 5.08% (p=0.001). In 
Model F, when controlling with the expenditures on cash allowances and the expenditures on 
family services, the mortality decreases by 5.01% (p=0.002). In Model G, when controlling for 
the expenditures on maternity and parental leave and the expenditures on family services, job-
protected paid leave reduces post-neonatal mortality by 4.75% (p=0.003). Finally, in Model H, 
when controlling for all expenditure variables simultaneously (cash allowances, maternity and 
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prenatal leave, and family services), a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave 
significantly reduces post-neonatal mortality by 4.90% (p=0.002). Therefore, the results are 
robust throughout all of the model specifications, controlling for any two or all three social 
expenditures concurrently.  
 
Results II: The effects of leave policy by period and across welfare regimes 
Effects of Family Leave Policy by Period 
Table 3-1 presents the results showing the effects of leave policy on post-neonatal 
mortality by period. I include all six major control variables and country and year fixed effects as 
well as country-time trend interactions. While all of my results above indicate significant effects 
of job-protected paid leave in reducing post-neonatal mortality overall from 1969 to 2010, I 
explore whether the policy effects vary by period with models estimated separately by two time 
periods—the earlier period (from 1969 to 1989) and the later period (from 1990 to 2010). The 
results indicate that a 10-week extension of job-protected paid leave policy significantly reduces 
post-neonatal mortality by 4.94% (p=0.006) in the earlier period—from 1969 to 1989. On the 
other hand, the results indicate that a 10-week extensions of job-protected paid leave 
significantly decreases the mortality rate by 4.19% (p=0.015) in the later period—from 1990 to 
2010. Therefore, the results suggest that larger effects of job-protected paid leave in reducing 
post-neonatal mortality rate are found in the earlier period; however, the difference in the policy 
effects between the two periods is not statistically significant.
54
 Other leave has no significant 
effects in reducing the mortality rate in both periods. 
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I compared the estimated coefficients between the two periods to test null hypothesis Ho: Bearly=Blater, where 
Bearly is the estimated coefficient for the early period (1969-1989) and Blater is the estimated coefficient for the later 




Effects of Family Leave Policy by Welfare Regime 
Table 3-2 shows the results that indicate the effects of leave policy on post-neonatal 
mortality by welfare regime, with models estimated separately by regime type. The 19 OECD 
countries are categorized into five groups: (Regime 1) Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden; (Regime 2) Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands; (Regime 3) South European: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; (Regime 4) Liberal: 
Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, and the US; and (Regime 5) East Asian: Japan and Korea. The 
summary of weeks of leave across welfare regimes is presented in Table 1-9 (Table 1-6 presents 
more detailed information about each country). As of 2010, for Social Democratic countries, job-
protected paid leave is provided for an average of 70.0 weeks, and other leave is provided for an 
average of 43.8 weeks. For Conservative countries, 20.6 weeks of job-protected paid leave are 
provided, and 92.6 weeks of other leave are provided. In South European countries, 41.8 weeks 
and 51.1 weeks, 19.8 weeks and 20.5 weeks in Liberal countries, and 13.5 and 44.0 weeks in 
East Asian countries are currently provided for job-protected paid leave and other leave, 
respectively. 
Throughout all of the models, I include all six control variables and country and decade 
fixed effects (instead of year fixed effects) as well as country and decade linear trend interactions 
(instead of country time linear trend interactions). I use decade fixed effects and decade linear 
trend (instead of year and time linear, respectively) because I lose too many degrees of freedom 
(and, therefore, power) for each regime.  
The results indicate that in Regime 1 (Social Democratic), a 10-week extension of job-
protected paid leave significantly decreases post-neonatal mortality by 7.46% (p=0.001). Other 
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leave has no policy effects on the mortality rate. In Regime 2 (Conservative), the extension of 
job-protected paid leave significantly decreases post-neonatal mortality by 9.76% (p=0.006). In 
addition, in this regime, a 10-week extension of other leave also predicts a decrease in post-
neonatal mortality by 1.14% (p=0.018). In Regime 3 (Southern Europe), the effects of job-
protected paid leave are found to be significant in reducing post-neonatal mortality by 5.87% 
(p=0.003). When it comes to other leave, no significant effects are found. In Regime 4 (Liberal) 
and Regime 5 (East Asian), no significant effects of both job-protected paid leave and other 
leave are found. Comparing the coefficients across regimes, the difference in the policy effects is 
not statistically significant. However, the larger effects of leave policy found in the Social 




Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Conclusion and Discussions 
Consistent with previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005), this paper found that an 
extension of job-protected paid leave has significant effects in reducing infant mortality; a 10-
week extension of job-protected paid leave decreases infant mortality by 2.06% (Table 2-1). 
Larger effects are found in reducing post-neonatal mortality; a 10-week extension of job-
projected paid leave significantly reduces the mortality rate by 6.16% (Table 2-4). Compared 
with the effects of job-protected paid leave, other leave (unpaid or non-job protected leave) does 
not show significant effects on any of the health outcome indicators. This suggests that when 
family leave policy is provided without sufficient payment benefits or job protection, parents do 
not respond to the policy, and mothers may return to work early. As a result, other leave does not 
have any significant effects on improving child health. 
I did not find any significant effects of job-protected paid leave on perinatal (Table 2-2) 
and neonatal (Table 2-3) mortality rates. The results make sense because these outcome 
indicators usually reflect the parents’ pre-birth health condition and investments as well as at-
birth health status and care access, which will not change dramatically by the limited pre-birth 
leave (5-6 weeks) recommended in OECD countries (Gauthier, 2011a; Tanaka, 2005). In order to 
investigate the effects of pre-existing and at-birth condition on mortality rates, more relevant data 
(e.g., data on lifestyle, including drinking and smoking habits; work routine, including workload 
and hours; parents’ baseline health; prenatal care; and breastfeeding) need to be included; 
however, they are not currently available for the 19 OECD countries over the last four decades. 
In addition, I did not find any significant effects of job-protected paid leave on child mortality 
(Table 2-5); this can be explained by the fact that most leave policies do not last until the child’s 
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fifth birthday. While most countries did extend their leave policy both in duration and payment 
over the last four decades, the longest childcare leave allows for parents to take leave until the 
child reaches the age of 3 years old, usually provided in Social Democratic and Conservative 
welfare state countries. Moreover, older children are more likely to be out of the home and, thus, 
there would be many other factors that may contribute to their mortality.  
I also did not find any significant effects of job-protected paid leave on low birth weight 
(Table 2-6); this makes sense because low birth weight results from a complex interaction of 
diverse factors. Similar to prenatal and neonatal mortality rates, pre-birth factors for expecting 
parents must be considered to understand the accurate dynamics between leave policy and low 
birth weight (e.g., lifestyle, work routine, parents’ baseline health, and prenatal care). As 
mentioned previously, sufficient data on these indicators are not available. 
Low birth weight was expected to be one of the mediators (along with immunization rates 
for measles and DPT) between leave policy and mortality rates, as it can be a critical risk factor 
for infant health. However, the results suggest that because there is no significant relationship 
between the policy and low birth weight, it is unlikely that controlling for low birth weight 




Furthermore, I did not find any significant effects of job-protected paid leave on 
immunization rates for measles (Table 2-7) and DPT (Table 2-8). One possible interpretation can 
be that the immunization rates have grown to be very high (i.e., in the high 90s without much 
fluctuation) in most OECD countries; therefore, it can be difficult to see variations in the rates 
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Tanaka (2005) found significant effects of job-protected paid leave in reducing low birth weight; in addition, when 
estimating the policy effects on post-neonatal mortality rate controlling for low birth weight as a mediator, the 
results were still significant. 
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caused by leave policy. Moreover, the fact that the vaccination schedule for measles is 
introduced after the child’s first birthday in many countries could be another explanation. 
Along with low birth weight, immunization rates for measles and DPT were also 
expected to be additional mediators between leave policy and mortality outcomes, as they can be 
important protective factors for infant health during the first year of a newborn’s life. However, 
the results suggest that because there is no significant relationship between leave policy and both 
immunization rates, controlling for them would not explain the mechanism in which leave policy 
influences mortality outcomes. The results are consistent with previous research (Ruhm, 2000; 
Tanaka; 2005). 
The effects of job protected paid leave on post-neonatal mortality are robust with 
different model specifications (Table 2-10). In particular, when controlling for the additional 
social policy variables—including public social welfare expenditures on family cash allowances, 
the expenditures on maternity and parental leave, and the expenditures on family services—I 
found that the effects of leave policy on post-neonatal mortality are not eliminated. Also, when 
controlling for those expenditure variables concurrently, the effects of leave policy are still 
robust. Therefore, the results indicate that leave policy has positive effects in reducing post-
neonatal mortality rate, even after taking into consideration the generosity of social expenditure 
components. 
Particularly concerning the expenditures on maternity and parental leave, as was 
previously indicated, I had expected that the magnitude of the effects of leave policy would be 
diminished when the expenditures are controlled for, since the two variables (expenditures on 
leave and family leave policy) are closely related; however, no such results are found. One 
possible explanation is inconsistent data collecting methods or definitions of the expenditures 
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across countries. For instance, for countries such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, the OECD 
social expenditure data indicate that there are no expenditures on maternity and parental leave; 
although the two countries have a record of the expenditures on leave (ILO, 2010) – provided 
through the social security system in the Netherlands and the mixed system of social security and 
mandatory insurance in Switzerland – the OECD data indicate that there are “zero” expenditures 
in recent years. Countries may vary in collecting data or defining what the expenditures exactly 
consist of.  
An additional focus was to examine whether the effects of leave policy in reducing post-
neonatal mortality vary by period, with models estimated separately by two time periods—the 
early period (1969-1989) and the later period (1990-2010). The results indicate that the policy 
effects are greater during the earlier time (Table 3-1). While the effects of job-protected paid 
leave are significant in reducing post-neonatal mortality rate in both periods overall, a 10-week 
extension of job-protected paid leave is predicted to decrease post-neonatal mortality by 4.94% 
from 1969 to 1990, whereas the effects are 4.19% from 1990 to 2010. Although the difference in 
the policy effects between the two periods is not statistically significant, this difference is 
interesting and may be partly explained by the fact that it was during the earlier period when 
most OECD countries provided leave policy for the crucial few weeks and months of a 
newborn’s life. 
I also examined whether the effects of leave policy on post-neonatal mortality vary by 
welfare regime with models estimated separately by regime type. The results indicate the 
existence of three welfare regimes, in which significant policy effects are found (Table 3-2): the 
Social Democratic, Conservative, and Southern European regimes. A 10-week extension of job-
protected paid leave significantly reduces post-neonatal mortality by 7.46% in the Social 
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Democratic regime, 9.76% in the Conservative regime, and 5.87% in the Southern European 
regime. On the other hand, no significant results are found in the Liberal and East Asian regimes. 
This difference in effects across regime types may be partly explained by the fact that, overall, 
Social Democratic and Conservative welfare countries provide more generous payment benefits 
for parents on leave.
56
  
Considering wage replacement payment rates attached to maternity leave as of 2010 (ILO, 
2010), for the Social Democratic regime, all countries provide a 100% payment rate, except 
Sweden (70%). In the Conservative regime, all countries provide a 100% payment rate, except 
Belgium, where 82% is paid for the first 30 days and 75% for the remaining weeks of maternity 
leave. In the Southern European regime, all countries provide a 100% payment rate, except Italy 
(80%). In contrast, in the Liberal regime, both Ireland and Switzerland provide an 80% payment 
rate; the UK provides 90% for the first 6 weeks and a flat rate for weeks 7 to 39; and the US has 
no payment benefits because there is no federal mandate on maternity leave. In the East Asian 
regime, Japan provides a 67% payment rate and Korea a 100% payment rate. Therefore, while it 
is difficult to compare exact payment arrangements for job-protected paid leave, when looking to 
maternity leave, the overall payment rates are higher in the Social Democratic, Conservative, and 
Southern European regimes. Therefore, the disparity in payment benefits may partly explain the 
results seen in Table 3-2. Further research needs to be done with more detailed data for this topic.  
In sum, with more years of data (from 2001 to 2010) and with data on one additional 
country (Korea), this research confirms and extends the findings from previous studies (Ruhm, 
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When it comes to comparing payment benefits across countries and regimes, I can discuss payment benefits 
attached to statutory maternity leave only (or leave that is strictly reserved for mothers in countries like Sweden and 
Norway, where there is no official maternity leave, as it was replaced by parental leave in the 1970s), because 
otherwise, more detailed data are needed due to a complex system of payment arrangements country by country. In 




2000; Tanaka, 2005), especially regarding the effects of job protected paid leave on post-
neonatal mortality. My findings confirm that job-protected paid leave significantly decreases 
deaths, especially during the first critical year after birth. Indeed, if anything, the policy effects 
are amplified compared to those from the previous studies, probably due to an improved policy 
measure as well as the imputation of missing data.  Furthermore, adding one more East Asian 
country – Korea – allows me to include East Asian countries in my comparison of welfare 
regime types. Here my findings suggest that there may be different policy effects across regime 
types, and thus this study may provide a platform from which more research can be conducted 
with newly added countries from not only East Asia but also other regions of the world. 
 
Policy Implications 
When leave is provided without sufficient payment benefits or job protection, parents do 
not seem to respond to the policy. This implies that if leave policy is to reduce death rates among 
newborns and young children, it must be provided with proper payment benefits that would 
support parents to maintain their income source and continue to invest in their newborns, 
especially during the first critical weeks or months after birth. Moreover, job protection is an 
important part of leave policy because it guarantees continuous and stable employment for 
parents when returning from childbirth and care. Therefore, it is expected that parents are more 
likely to take leave when job protection is given. 
In addition, if leave policy is to reduce other mortality rates, especially deaths that occur 
within the first month of a newborn’s life—i.e., perinatal and neonatal deaths and low birth 
weight—pre-birth leave should perhaps be required, rather than simply recommended, and it 
should perhaps be more generous/longer than 5-6 weeks, which is the current average provision 
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in the 19 OECD countries. Leave policy that requires and guarantees longer pre-birth leave, 
coupled with sufficient payment benefits, may be more likely to reduce those early mortality 
rates, as pre-birth leave could contribute to the parents’ pre- and at-birth health conditions and 
quality of life.  
Furthermore, other supports for expecting parents to better invest in themselves and their 
coming newborns might improve overall health outcomes; for instance, if parents are guaranteed 
to be provided with easier and affordable access to high-quality prenatal care on a regular basis, 
it is more likely that the parents and their newborns will be healthy. Also, allowing expecting 
working mothers to have a more flexible work schedule, perhaps with a reduced workload and 
hours, can be another way to help them to better prepare for childbirth and care. Moreover, 
family-friendly work cultures and environments in which men can take their leave entitlement 
may greatly contribute to the welfare of mothers and infants. In sum, for effective improvements 
in the welfare and health of parents and their infants, the government must plan and implement 
family policy in collaboration with multiple sectors and industries. 
 
Research Challenges and Future Implications 
For research that examines the effects of family policy on various health outcomes, more 
data need to be collected. For instance, outcome indicators, such as earlier mortality rates (i.e., 
perinatal and neonatal deaths and low birth weight) can be heavily influenced by pre-existing and 
at-birth factors; therefore, data related to pre- and at-birth health can further inform us about the 
mechanism, in which leave policy influences those health outcomes. Moreover, as a number of 
researchers have already pointed out, policy variations and definitions across countries make it 
challenging to conduct cross-national research, as this study does. For instance, in countries like 
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Sweden and Norway, there is no official maternity leave because it was replaced by parental 
leave in the 1970s (Gauthier, 2011b; OECD, 2012a, Tanaka, 2005). Even when it comes to 
defining the same leave that allows parents to take leave until the child becomes 3 years old, it is 
sometimes under childcare leave (e.g., Finland) and in other cases, parental leave (e.g., Germany 
and Spain). Furthermore, while this research looks into two types of policy measure—job-
protected paid leave and other leave (unpaid or non-job protected)—payment benefits during 
leave are provided in complex and unique channels and methods country by country; therefore, it 
is difficult to compare the true generosity of family leave policy, and this remains an important 
topic for future research. 
Finally, policymakers and researchers must consider other emerging market countries. As 
more emerging market countries around the world recognize the importance of families in 
diverse forms and their unique needs and demands in balancing family and work responsibilities, 
it is crucial to collect comparable data using universally agreed-upon methods. It is important to 
conduct cross-national research to investigate the effects of family policy on various health and 
social outcomes in newly added countries; while the policy may look similar on the surface, the 
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Mortality Rates in 19 OECD Countries, 1970-2010 
Mortality Rates 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Infant*  22.1 11.9 7.5 4.8 3.5 
Perinatal 25.6 13.3 8.5 6.5 5.3 
Neonatal 14.0 7.7 4.5 3.2 2.3 
Post-neonatal 5.4 3.9 3.0 1.6 1.2 
Child 4.2 2.3 1.6 0.9 0.7 
Data Source: OECD, WHO, and World Bank. 
Numbers are scaled per 1,000 live births. 


































Mean 32.7 10.6 99.0 62 1.68 
Austria 35.3 11.0 99.3 66 1.44 
Belgium 32.9 10.7 99 57 1.84 
Denmark 32.4 11.4 100 71 1.87 
Finland 31.3 9.0 100 67 1.87 
France 29.6 11.9 99.9 60 2.00 
Germany 33.6 11.6 100 66 1.39 
Greece 24.0 10.2 100 48 1.44 
Ireland 36.8 9.2 100 56 2.07 
Italy 27.1 9.5 100 46 1.40 
Japan 30.8 9.5 100 60 1.39 
Korea 26.8 6.9 100 53 1.22 
Netherlands 36.9 11.9 98.9 70 1.79 
Norway 46.8 9.5 100 73 1.95 
Portugal 21.8 11.0 100 61 1.32 
Spain 26.9 9.5 99.2 52 1.39 
Sweden 34.1 9.6 100 70 1.98 
Switzerland 39.3 11.5 100 73 1.50 
UK 32.8 9.6 100 65 1.94 
US 41.9 17.9 84 62 2.10 
Data Source: OECD, WHO, and World Bank. 
*GDP per capita in thousands of PPP-adjusted constant US dollars, base year 2005. 
** Total expenditures on healthcare as % of GDP. 
*** Share of population with health insurance coverage (public and primary private insurance: In all countries, 
more than 99% of the population is covered by the public health insurance, except Germany (89.2% public and 10.8% 
primary private) and the United States (26.4% public and 54.9% primary private). 
**** Female employment to population ratio in %. 

























0.8 0.3 0.8 
Austria 2.9 2.2 0.2 0.5 
Belgium 2.8 1.6 0.2 0.9 
Denmark 3.9 1.0 0.6 2.0 
Finland 3.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 
France 3.2 1.1 0.3 1.3 
Germany 2.1 0.8 0.3 0.5 
Greece 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Ireland  4.1 1.8 0.2 0.8 
Italy 1.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 
Japan 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 
Korea 0.8 0.01 0.03 0.7 
Netherlands 1.7 0.8 - 0.9 
Norway 3.2 0.6 0.7 1.2 
Portugal 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.4 
Spain 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Sweden 3.7 0.8 0.8 2.0 
Switzerland** 1.3 0.9 - 0.3 
 UK 3.8 0.8 0.4 1.1 
 US 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Data Source: OECD. 
-Data not available. 
All figures are in % of GDP, USD PPP-adjusted. 
* Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity and parental leave, and family services are sub-categories of 
the total expenditures on families. This also includes other family-related cash benefits and services such as housing 
and residential care help, which may impact child health outcomes either directly or indirectly. 









Total Public Expenditures on Families* in 19 OECD Countries by Period 
 







on Family  
Services 
1969-1979 - - - 
1980-1989 3.22 5.16 5.40 
1990-1999 4.64 9.94 8.09 
2000-2010 7.19 16.70 29.68 
Data Source: OECD. 
-Data not available. 
All figures are in USD PPP-adjusted. 
* Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity and parental leave, and family services are sub-categories of 
the total expenditures on families. This also includes other family-related cash benefits and services such as housing 



































Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 N Mean S.D. 
    
Outcome Variable     
 Infant mortality* (death ratio of children under the 1 year 
of age) 
 Perinatal mortality* (death ratio of children within 1 
week of life and stillbirths) 
 Neonatal mortality* (death ratio of children under 28 
days of age) 
 Post-neonatal mortality* (death ratio of children between 
28 days and 1 year of age) 
 Child mortality* (between 1 and 5 years of age) 
 Low birth weight* (< 2,500 grams) 
 Immunization DPT by age 1 













       9.4 
 
     11.2 
  





       5.9 
     88.9% 
     81.8% 













Independent Variables**    
 Weeks of job protected paid leave 
 Weeks of other leave 















GDP per capita*** 
Health insurance coverage**** 
Number of Dialysis patients per 100,000 population 
Total Expenditures on healthcare as % of GDP 
Public expenditures on family cash allowances  
per child***** 
Public expenditures on maternity and parental leave  
per child***** 






















      30.4 
        7.8 
5.1 
 
    10.7 
 




















* Numbers are scaled per 1,000 live births. For child mortality, as previously done, infant mortality was subtracted 
from child mortality which in this study refers to the number of deaths between ages 1 and 5 (under age 5 according 
to the WHO and OECD definition). 
** Job protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family leave and adoptive but not paternity leave. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected 
paid leave, which includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected e.g. Austria 
and Germany. In addition, I added childcare leave that is also either unpaid or provided at a very low flat rate. 
*** In thousands of PPP-adjusted constant US dollars, base year 2005. 
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****In all countries, more than 99% of the population is covered by the public health insurance, except Germany 
(89.2% public and 10.8% primary private) and the United States (26.4% public and 54.9% primary private) in 2010. 
*****In thousands of PPP-adjusted constant US dollars. For the expenditures per child, the public expenditures on 
family cash allowances and family services are divided by the number of children ages 0-14. The public 
expenditures on maternity and parental leave are divided by the number of children ages 0-4. Similar method was 
applied in previous studies. Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity and parental leave, and family 










Weeks of Leave in 19 OECD Countries, 2010 






Austria 16.0 104.0 120.0 
Belgium 41.0 13.0 54.0 
Denmark 50.0 0.0 50.0 
Finland 57.4 127.3 184.7 
France 16.0 146.0 162.0 
Germany 14.0 148.0 162.0 
Greece 43.0 30.5 73.5 
Ireland  26.0 44.0 70.0 
Italy 65.2 0.0 65.2 
Japan 14.0 44.0 58.0 
Korea 13.0 44.0 57.0 
Netherlands 16.0 52.0 68.0 
Norway 104.0 0.0 104.0 
Portugal 43.1 26.0 69.1 
Spain 16.0 148.0 164.0 
Sweden 68.6 43.7 112.3 
Switzerland 14.0 0.0 14.0 
 UK 39.0 26.0 65.0 
 US 0.0 12.0 12.0 
Data Source: Data gathered by Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) as well as the Comparative Family Policy data 
from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Gauthier, 2011a) and PF 2.5. Annex: Detail of Change 
in Parental Leave by Country (OECD, 2012b). 
 
Note: Job-protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family and adoptive leave, but not paternity leave. In addition, I control separately for weeks of other leave as my 
second independent variable. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected paid leave, which 
includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected (e.g., Austria and Germany). In 
addition, I add childcare leave that is also either unpaid or paid at a very low flat rate and not clearly job-protected. 
In the effort to follow previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005), I adhere the following rules: (1) When there is 
no distinction between maternity leave and parental or childcare leave with the same job protection and payment, 
the leave is under “job-protected paid leave,” which was usually the case for the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, 
including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; (2) Parental leave and childcare leave in the dataset are usually 
the additional leave entitlements taken after maternity leave; therefore, in this case, total leave can be obtained 
simply by adding all weeks of leave. However, in some countries, parental or childcare leave is given until the child 
reaches a certain age, in which case maternity leave is already included in parental or childcare leave, as noted by 
Gauthier (2011a); thus, in this case, I deduct post-birth maternity leave from parental or childcare leave in order to 
avoid overestimation and correlation. For instance: (i) in Finland, childcare leave lasts until the child’s third 
birthday; (ii) in France, Germany, and Spain, parental leave lasts until the child’s third birthday; and (iii) in 
Sweden, childcare leave lasts until the 18
 
months of age; and (3) when no differentiation between pre-birth and 
post-birth maternity leave is noted, I assume them to be equal except for: (i) Japan (from 2000 and 2010), where 14 
total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be six pre-birth and eight post-birth as previous years; (ii) the UK 
(from 1998 to 2003), where 18 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be 11 pre-birth and seven post-birth, 
as in previous years; and (iii) Portugal (from 1996 to 1998), where 14 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to 






Key National Provisions for Maternity Protection, 2010 
Country Source 
Austria Social Security 
Belgium Social Security 
Denmark Mixed: Local Government and Employer 
Finland Social Security 
France Social Security 
Germany Mixed: Social Security and Employer 
Greece Mixed: Social Security and State 
Ireland Social Security 
Italy Social Security 
Japan Social Security 
Korea Mixed: Social Security and Employer 
Netherlands Social Security 
Norway Social Security 
Portugal Social Security 
Spain Social Security 
Sweden Social Security 
Switzerland Mixed: Social Security and Mandatory Insurance 
(50% Employee and 50% Employer) 
UK Mixed: Social Security and State 
US No National Program 







Weeks of Leave in 19 OECD Countries, 1970-2010 






1970 12.7 4.2 16.9 
1980 17.5 20.5 37.9 
1990 20.6 40.0 60.6 
2000 28.5 52.2 80.7 
2010 34.5 53.1 87.6 
Data Source: Data gathered by Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) as well as the Comparative Family Policy data 
from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Gauthier, 2011a) and PF 2.5. Annex: Detail of Change 
in Parental Leave by Country (OECD, 2012b). 
 
Note: Job-protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family and adoptive leave, but not paternity leave. In addition, I control separately for weeks of other leave as my 
second independent variable. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected paid leave, which 
includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected (e.g., Austria and Germany). In 
addition, I add childcare leave that is also either unpaid or paid at a very low flat rate and not clearly job-protected. 
In the effort to follow previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005), I adhere the following rules: (1) When there is 
no distinction between maternity leave and parental or childcare leave with the same job protection and payment, 
the leave is under “job-protected paid leave,” which was usually the case for the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, 
including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; (2) Parental leave and childcare leave in the dataset are usually 
the additional leave entitlements taken after maternity leave; therefore, in this case, total leave can be obtained 
simply by adding all weeks of leave. However, in some countries, parental or childcare leave is given until the child 
reaches a certain age, in which case maternity leave is already included in parental or childcare leave, as noted by 
Gauthier (2011a); thus, in this case, I deduct post-birth maternity leave from parental or childcare leave in order to 
avoid overestimation and correlation. For instance: (i) in Finland, childcare leave lasts until the child’s third 
birthday; (ii) in France, Germany, and Spain, parental leave lasts until the child’s third birthday; and (iii) in 
Sweden, childcare leave lasts until the 18
 
months of age; and (3) when no differentiation between pre-birth and 
post-birth maternity leave is noted, I assume them to be equal except for: (i) Japan (from 2000 and 2010), where 14 
total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be six pre-birth and eight post-birth as previous years; (ii) the UK 
(from 1998 to 2003), where 18 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be 11 pre-birth and seven post-birth, 
as in previous years; and (iii) Portugal (from 1996 to 1998), where 14 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to 







Summary of Weeks of Leave by Welfare Regime 
19 OECD Countries, 2010 






Social Democratic 70.0 43.8 113.8 
Conservative 20.6 92.6 113.2 
South European 41.8 51.1 93.0 
Liberal 19.8 20.5 40.3 
East Asian 13.5 44.0 57.5 
Total Mean 34.5 53.1 87.6 
Data Source: Data gathered by Ruhm (2000) and Tanaka (2005) as well as the Comparative Family Policy data 
from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Gauthier, 2011a) and PF 2.5. Annex: Detail of Change 
in Parental Leave by Country (OECD, 2012b). 
 
Note: Job-protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family and adoptive leave, but not paternity leave. In addition, I control separately for weeks of other leave as my 
second independent variable. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected paid leave, which 
includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected (e.g., Austria and Germany). In 
addition, I add childcare leave that is also either unpaid or paid at a very low flat rate and not clearly job-protected. 
In the effort to follow previous studies (Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005), I adhere the following rules: (1) When there is 
no distinction between maternity leave and parental or childcare leave with the same job protection and payment, 
the leave is under “job-protected paid leave,” which was usually the case for the Nordic/Scandinavian countries, 
including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; (2) Parental leave and childcare leave in the dataset are usually 
the additional leave entitlements taken after maternity leave; therefore, in this case, total leave can be obtained 
simply by adding all weeks of leave. However, in some countries, parental or childcare leave is given until the child 
reaches a certain age, in which case maternity leave is already included in parental or childcare leave, as noted by 
Gauthier (2011a); thus, in this case, I deduct post-birth maternity leave from parental or childcare leave in order to 
avoid overestimation and correlation. For instance: (i) in Finland, childcare leave lasts until the child’s third 
birthday; (ii) in France, Germany, and Spain, parental leave lasts until the child’s third birthday; and (iii) in 
Sweden, childcare leave lasts until the 18
 
months of age; and (3) when no differentiation between pre-birth and 
post-birth maternity leave is noted, I assume them to be equal except for: (i) Japan (from 2000 and 2010), where 14 
total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be six pre-birth and eight post-birth as previous years; (ii) the UK 
(from 1998 to 2003), where 18 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to be 11 pre-birth and seven post-birth, 
as in previous years; and (iii) Portugal (from 1996 to 1998), where 14 total weeks of maternity leave are assumed to 
be 5.4 pre-birth and 8.6 post-birth, as in previous years. 
 
Welfare Regime Categorization (See Table 1-6 for details of each country): 
(1) Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
(2) Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands  
(3) South European: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(4) Liberal: Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, and the US 









Missing Values in Original Data 
 N Mean S.D. Missing Values 
Count Percent 
Perinatal 730 11.15 6.64 68 8.5 
Infant 798 9.39 7.08 0 0 
Neonatal 727 6.03 4.39 71 8.9 
Post-neonatal 738 2.99 2.52 60 7.5 
Child 798 1.87 1.42 0 0 
Low birth weight 639 5.85 1.36 159 19.9 
Measles 566 81.83 18.62 232 29.1 
DPT 591 88.88 12.68 207 25.9 
Health expenditures 771 7.83 2.12 27 3.4 
Insurance coverage 781 93.19 15.13 17 2.1 
Dialysis patients 662 30.43 35.00 136 17.0 
Female employment 742 0.54 0.13 56 7.0 
Fertility rates 798 1.80 0.48 0 0 
GDP per capita 782 23.86 8.17 16 2.0 
Expenditures on 
family cash benefit 
549 5.11 10.72 249 31.2 
Expenditures on 
mat/parental leave 
498 10.68 22.91 300 37.6 
Expenditures on 
family services 
501 15.73 71.96 297 37.2 








18.72 0 0 

























Note: Job protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family leave and adoptive but not paternity leave. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected 
paid leave, which includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected e.g. Austria 
and Germany. In addition, I added childcare leave that is also either unpaid or provided at a very low flat rate. 
Underlined variables are ones with more than 10% missing values and in a specific pattern; data on low birth 
weight and immunizations for measles and DPT as well as social expenditures are missing for most countries until 
1980. Some data on dialysis patients are missing for Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Norway, Sweden, and 







Summary of Variables after Multiple Imputations  
 Original Data* Imputed Data** 
Variables N Mean N Mean 
Perinatal 730 11.15 798 11.15 
Infant 798 9.39 798 9.39 
Neonatal 727 6.03 798 6.24 
Post-neonatal 738 2.99 798 3.13 
Child 798 1.87 798 1.87 
Low birth weight 639 5.85 639 5.85 
Measles 566 81.83 566 81.83 
DPT 591 88.88 591 88.88 
Health expenditures 771 7.83 798 7.78 
Insurance coverage 781 93.19 798 92.93 
Dialysis patients 662 30.43 662 30.43 
Female employment 742 0.54 798 0.53 
Fertility rates 798 1.80 798 1.80 
GDP per capita 782 23.86 798 23.68 
Expenditures on family 
cash benefit 
549 5.11 549 5.11 
Expenditures on 
mat/parental leave 
498 10.68 498 10.68 
Expenditures on family 
services 
501 15.73 501 15.73 
Job protected paid leave 798 21.93 798 21.93 
Other leave  798 32.82 798 32.82 
Total leave 798 54.75 798 54.79 
 
Note: Job protected paid leave refers to weeks of job protected paid maternity and parental leave, which includes 
family leave and adoptive but not paternity leave. Other leave refers to weeks of unpaid leave and non-job protected 
paid leave, which includes parental leave provided at a very low flat rate and not clearly job protected e.g. Austria 
and Germany. In addition, I added childcare leave that is also either unpaid or provided at a very low flat rate. 
*Table 1-5 provides details of the original data. 
** Multiple Imputations include all variables with missing values except variables with more than 10% missing 
values (underlined; and see Table 1-10 above for more details) since they are missing with a systematic pattern; 
data on low birth weight and immunizations for measles and DPT, as well as social expenditures are missing for 
most countries until 1980. Some data on dialysis patients are missing for Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland prior to 1980.In the process of MIs, I applied appropriate restrictions for the selected 
variables; for instance, values should not exceed 100 for variables in % such as health expenditures and health 
insurance coverage. Female employment ranges from 0 to 1. For all variables, including outcome variables, I 








Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Infant Mortality 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
   Infant  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.205**   -0.192**  -0.200**  -0.206**  
 
Other Leave  
 

































   (0.001) 
0.012 
   (0.022) 
   0.098 















  (0.093) 
 
Country fixed effects 





















662 N  662 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 










Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Perinatal Mortality  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
   Perinatal  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.080   0.055  0.115  0.096  
 
Other Leave  
 






































  (0.101) 
0.057 
 (0.022) 
  -0.017** 
   (0.004) 
   -0.006 
   (0.010) 
   0.004** 
   (0.001) 
  -0.008** 
    (0.001) 
    -0.069* 
    (0.034) 
   -0.133 
    (0.172) 
 
Country fixed effects 





















662 N  662 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 














Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Neonatal Mortality 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
   Neonatal  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   0.008   0.089  0.095  0.070  
 
Other Leave  
 






















































Country fixed effects 





















662 N  662 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 














Effects of Family Leave Policy on Post-neonatal Mortality 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
   Post-neonatal  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.517**   -0.636**  -0.621**  -0.616**  
 
Other Leave  
 























































Country fixed effects 





















662 N  662 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 














Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Child Mortality 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
   Child  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.150   -0.203  -0.240  -0.256  
 
Other Leave  
 






















































Country fixed effects 





















662 N  662 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 














Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Low Birth Weight 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
    Low Birth Weight   
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.048   -0.032  -0.024  -0.017  
 
Other Leave  
 






















































Country fixed effects 





















439 N  439 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 










Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Immunization for Measles 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
 
   Immunization  
for Measles 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.100   -0.163  0.034  0.070  
 
Other Leave  
 






















































Country fixed effects 





















437 N  437 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 













Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Immunization for DPT 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
 
   Immunization  
for DPT 
  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.406   -0.381  -0.399  -0.336  
 
Other Leave  
 























































Country fixed effects 





















452 N  452 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 













Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality, 
Including Low Birth Weight and Immunizations for Measles and DPT 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
 
   Post-neonatal  
Mortality  
  
Regressor  Model A  Model B Model C Model D 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.367*   -0.377*  -0.416**  -0.401**  
 
Other Leave  
 











































Country fixed effects 





















406 N   406 
            
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. Controls include GDP per 
capita, expenditures on healthcare, health insurance coverage, dialysis, fertility, and female employment. Expanded results are presented in 














Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality,  
Including Social Expenditures  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
     Post-neonatal  
      Mortality  
Regressor       Model A                Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 























































Other Leave  
 
Expenditures on family 
cash benefits 
Expenditures on maternity 
& parental leave 




























Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 























N 375          375 375 375 
         
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. For the expenditures per 
child, the public expenditures on family cash allowances and family services are divided by the number of children ages 0-14. The public 
expenditures on maternity and parental leave are divided by the number of children ages 0-4. Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity 
and parental leave, and family services are sub-categories of the total public expenditures on family (all expenditures are in thousands of PPP-
adjusted constant US dollars). Controls include GDP per capita, expenditures on healthcare, health insurance coverage, dialysis, fertility, and 













Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality by Period 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 1969-1989 1990-2010 
Regressor 









Other Leave  
 














      
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. Controls include GDP per 






















Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality across Welfare Regimes 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
  Post-neonatal  
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 4  Regime 5 




 -0.976**     -0.587**   -0.295   1.008 
 
Other Leave  
 
   (0.352) 
-0.114* 
(0.048) 
   (0.194) 
0.229 
(0.072) 
  (0.460) 
-0.521 
(0.302) 
  (2.518) 
0.267 
(0.076) 
Country fixed effects 
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*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. Controls include GDP per 
capita, expenditures on healthcare, health insurance coverage, dialysis, fertility, and female employment. Expanded results are presented in 
Appendix 7. 
 
Welfare Regime Categorization (See Table 1-6 for details of each country): 
(1) Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
(2) Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
(3) South European: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(4) Liberal: Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, and the US 












Appendix 1 (Expanded results from Table 1-1) 
 
Infant Mortality Rates in Each of 19 Countries, 1970-2010 by Decade 
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Mean 22.1 11.9 7.5 4.8 3.5 
Austria 25.9 14.3 7.8 4.8 3.9 
Belgium 21.1 12.1 8.0 4.8 3.5 
Denmark 14.2 8.4 7.5 5.3 3.4 
Finland 13.2 7.6 5.6 3.8 2.3 
France 18.2 10.0 7.3 4.5 3.6 
Germany 22.5 12.4 7.0 4.4 3.4 
Greece 29.6 17.9 9.7 5.9 3.8 
Ireland 19.5 11.1 8.2 6.2 3.8 
Italy 29.6 14.6 8.2 4.3 3.4 
Japan 13.1 7.5 4.6 3.2 2.3 
Korea 38.6 15.3 6.4 4.9 4.2 
Netherlands 12.7 8.6 7.1 5.1 3.8 
Norway 12.7 8.1 7.0 3.8 2.8 
Portugal 55.5 24.3 11.0 5.5 2.5 
Spain 28.1 12.3 7.6 4.3 3.2 
Sweden 11.0 6.9 6.0 3.4 2.5 
Switzerland 15.1 9.1 6.8 4.9 3.8 
UK 18.5 12.1 7.9 5.6 4.2 
US 20.0 12.6 9.2 6.9 6.1 
Data Source: OECD, WHO, and World Bank. 








Appendix 2 (Expanded results from Table 1-1) 
 
Infant Mortality Rates in Each of 19 Countries, 1969-2010 by Year 
 
Data Source: OECD, WHO, and World Bank. 
Numbers are scaled per 1,000 live births. 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Korea Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland The UK The US
1969 25.4 21.2 14.8 14.3 19.7 22.8 31.8 20.6 30.3 14.2 42.5 13.2 13.8 55.8 30.2 11.7 15.4 18.6 20.9
1970 25.9 21.1 14.2 13.2 18.2 22.5 29.6 19.5 29.6 13.1 38.6 12.7 12.7 55.5 28.1 11 15.1 18.5 20
1971 26.1 20.4 13.5 12.7 17.2 22.1 26.9 18 28.4 12.4 35.2 12.1 12.8 51.9 25.6 11.1 14.4 18 19.1
1972 25.2 18.8 12.2 12 16.1 21.6 27.3 18 26.8 11.7 32.1 11.7 11.8 41.4 22.8 10.8 13.3 17.5 18.5
1973 23.8 17.7 11.5 10.6 15.5 21.3 24.1 18 25.8 11.3 29.4 11.5 11.9 44.8 21.4 9.9 13.2 17.2 17.7
1974 23.5 17.4 10.7 11 14.7 20 23.9 17.8 22.4 10.8 26.8 11.3 10.4 37.9 19.8 9.6 12.5 16.8 16.7
1975 20.5 16.1 10.4 10 13.8 18.9 24 17.5 21.2 10 24.5 10.6 11.1 38.9 18.9 8.6 10.7 16.1 16.1
1976 18.2 15.3 10.2 9.2 12.5 16.6 22.5 15.5 18.9 9.3 22.3 10.7 10.5 33.4 17.1 8.3 10.7 14.5 15.2
1977 16.8 13.6 8.7 8.8 11.4 14.8 20.4 15.5 17.7 8.9 20.3 9.5 9.2 30.3 16 8 9.8 14.2 14.1
1978 15 13.3 8.8 7.7 10.7 14.3 19.3 14.9 16.8 8.4 18.3 9.6 8.6 29.1 15.3 7.6 8.6 13.2 13.8
1979 14.7 12.3 8.8 7.6 10 13.3 18.7 12.8 15.4 7.9 16.8 8.7 8.8 26 14.3 7.5 8.5 12.9 13.1
1980 14.3 12.1 8.4 7.6 10 12.4 17.9 11.1 14.6 7.5 15.3 8.6 8.1 24.3 12.3 6.9 9.1 12.1 12.6
1981 12.7 11.5 7.9 6.6 9.7 11.8 16.3 10.3 14.1 7.1 13.9 8.3 7.5 21.8 12.5 6.9 7.6 11.2 11.9
1982 12.8 11.1 8.2 6.1 9.5 11.1 15.1 10.5 13 6.6 12.7 8.3 8.1 19.8 11.3 6.8 7.7 11 11.5
1983 11.9 10.5 7.7 6.1 9.1 10.4 14.6 10.1 12.3 6.2 11.5 8.4 7.9 17.8 10.9 7 7.6 10.2 11.2
1984 11.4 10 7.7 6.6 8.3 9.8 14.3 9.6 11.4 6 10.3 8.3 8.3 16.7 9.9 6.4 7.1 9.6 10.8
1985 11.2 9.8 7.9 6.3 8.3 9.1 14.1 8.8 10.5 5.5 9.4 8 8.5 17.8 8.9 6.8 6.9 9.4 10.6
1986 10.3 9.6 8.2 5.9 8 8.7 12.2 8.9 10.2 5.2 8.5 7.7 7.9 15.9 9.2 5.9 6.8 9.5 10.4
1987 9.8 9.7 8.3 6.2 7.8 8.4 11.7 7.9 9.8 5 7.9 7.6 8.4 14.2 8.9 6.1 6.8 9.1 10.1
1988 8.1 9 7.6 6.1 7.8 7.6 11 8.9 9.3 4.8 7.3 6.8 8.3 13.1 8 5.8 6.8 9 10
1989 8.3 8.7 8 6 7.5 7.5 9.7 8.1 8.7 4.6 6.8 6.8 7.9 12.2 7.8 5.8 7.3 8.4 9.8
1990 7.8 8 7.5 5.6 7.3 7 9.7 8.2 8.2 4.6 6.4 7.1 7 11 7.6 6 6.8 7.9 9.2
1991 7.5 8.4 7.3 5.9 7.3 6.9 9 7.6 8.1 4.4 6 6.5 6.4 10.8 7.2 6.2 6.2 7.4 8.9
1992 7.5 9.6 6.6 5.2 6.8 6.2 8.4 6.5 7.9 4.5 5.7 6.3 5.9 9.3 7.1 5.3 6.4 6.6 8.5
1993 6.5 8 5.4 4.4 6.5 5.8 8.5 6.1 7.1 4.3 5.5 6.3 5.1 8.7 6.7 4.8 5.6 6.3 8.4
1994 6.3 7.6 5.5 4.6 5.9 5.6 7.9 5.7 6.6 4.2 5.4 5.6 5.2 8.1 6 4.4 5.1 6.2 8
1995 5.4 6.1 5.1 4 4.9 5.3 8.1 6.3 6.2 4.3 5.3 5.5 4.1 7.5 5.5 4.1 5 6.2 7.6
1996 5.1 5.6 5.6 3.9 4.8 5 7.2 6 6.2 3.8 5.2 5.7 4.1 6.9 5.5 4 4.7 6.1 7.3
1997 4.7 6.1 5.2 3.9 4.7 4.9 6.4 6.1 5.6 3.7 5.1 5 4.1 6.4 5 3.6 4.8 5.9 7.2
1998 4.9 5.6 4.7 4.1 4.6 4.7 6.7 6.2 5.4 3.6 5 5.2 4 6 4.9 3.5 4.8 5.7 7.2
1999 4.4 4.9 4.2 3.7 4.3 4.5 6.2 5.5 5.1 3.4 5 5.2 3.9 5.6 4.5 3.4 4.6 5.8 7.1
2000 4.8 4.8 5.3 3.8 4.5 4.4 5.9 6.2 4.3 3.2 4.9 5.1 3.8 5.5 4.3 3.4 4.9 5.6 6.9
2001 4.8 4.5 4.9 3.2 4.6 4.3 5.1 5.7 4.4 3.1 4.9 5.4 3.9 5 4 3.7 5 5.5 6.9
2002 4.1 4.4 4.4 3 4.2 4.2 5.1 5.1 4.1 3 4.8 5 3.5 5 4.1 3.3 4.5 5.2 7
2003 4.5 4.1 4.4 3.1 4.2 4.2 4 5.1 3.9 3 4.7 4.8 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.1 4.3 5.2 6.8
2004 4.5 3.9 4.4 3.3 4 4.1 4.1 4.8 3.9 2.8 4.6 4.4 3.2 3.8 3.9 3.1 4.2 5.1 6.8
2005 4.2 3.7 4.4 3 3.8 3.9 3.8 4 3.8 2.8 4.5 4.9 3.1 3.5 3.7 2.4 4.2 5.1 6.9
2006 3.6 4 3.5 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.6 4.4 4.4 3.2 3.3 3.5 2.8 4.4 5 6.7
2007 3.7 3.9 4 2.7 3.8 3.9 3.5 3.1 3.5 2.6 4.4 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 2.5 3.9 4.8 6.8
2008 3.7 3.7 4 2.6 3.8 3.5 2.7 3.8 3.3 2.6 4.3 3.8 2.7 3.3 3.3 2.5 4 4.7 6.6
2009 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.6 3.9 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.9 2.4 4.2 3.8 3.1 3.6 3.2 2.5 4.3 4.6 6.4






Appendix 3 (Expanded results from Table 2-9) 
 
Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality,  
Including low birth weight and immunizations for measles and DPT  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
    Post-neonatal Mortality    
Regressor  Model A  Model B Model C Model D 
Job Protected Paid Leave   -0.367*   -0.377*  -0.416**  -0.401**  
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 Appendix 4 (Expanded results from Table 2-10) 
 
Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality,  
Including Social Expenditures  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
                                                  Post-neonatal Mortality  
Regressor       Model A                Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 


























































































































Other Leave  
 
Expenditures on family 
cash benefits 
Expenditures on maternity 
& parental leave 
Expenditures on family 
services 
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N 375          375 375 375 







Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. For the expenditures per 
child, the public expenditures on family cash allowances and family services are divided by the number of children ages 0-14. The public 
expenditures on maternity and parental leave are divided by the number of children ages 0-4. Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity 
and parental leave, and family services are sub-categories of the total public expenditures on family (all expenditures are in thousands of PPP-







Appendix 5 (Expanded results from Table 2-10 with Cubic Time Trends) 
 
Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality,  
Including Social Expenditures  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1980-2010 
 
      Post-neonatal Mortality  
Regressor      Model A             Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Job Protected Paid Leave 























































Other Leave  
 
Expenditures on family cash 
benefits 
Expenditures on maternity & 
parental leave 
































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 























N 375          375 375 375 
         
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Note: Numbers shown are coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). All leave refers to weeks divided by 100. For the expenditures per 
child, the public expenditures on family cash allowances and family services are divided by the number of children ages 0-14. The public 
expenditures on maternity and parental leave are divided by the number of children ages 0-4. Expenditures on family cash allowances, maternity 
and parental leave, and family services are sub-categories of the total public expenditures on family (all expenditures are in thousands of PPP-







Appendix 6 (Expanded results from Table 3-1) 
 
Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality by Decade  
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 1969-1989 1990-2010 
Regressor 



































Other Leave  
 
 


























      
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 









Appendix 7 (Expanded results from Table 3-2) 
 
Effects of Family Leave Policy on Log of Post-neonatal Mortality across Welfare Regimes 
Estimates from OLS Models for 19 OECD Countries, 1969-2010 
 
 
  Post-neonatal 
Mortality 
  
Regressor  Regime 1  Regime 2  Regime 3  Regime 4  Regime 5 


































































































Country fixed effects 




                    0.91 
                    136 
    Yes 
    Yes 
    Yes 
     0.96 
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                  Yes 
                  Yes 
                   0.91 
                   135 
                    Yes 
                   Yes 
                   Yes 
                    0.99 




           
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 











Welfare Regime Categorization (See Table 1-6 for details of each country): 
(1) Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
(2) Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
(3) South European: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(4) Liberal: Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, and the US 
(5) East Asian: Japan and Korea 
 
